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Bed Bath & Beyond Förvaltning
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Bed Bath & Beyond VD är Sue Gove, utsedd i Jun 2022, har en mandatperiod på 1.33 år. totala årliga ersättningen är $ 4.78M, bestående av 18.8% lön 81.2% bonusar, inklusive företagsaktier och optioner. äger direkt 0.015% av företagets aktier, värda $ 9.09K. Den genomsnittliga mandatperioden för ledningsgruppen och styrelsen är 1.3 år respektive 4.4 år.
Viktig information
Sue Gove
Verkställande direktör
US$4.8m
Total ersättning
| VD-lön i procent | 18.81% |
| Anställning som VD | 1.3yrs |
| Ägande av VD | 0.01% |
| Ledningens genomsnittliga anställningstid | 1.3yrs |
| Styrelsens genomsnittliga mandatperiod | 4.4yrs |
Senaste uppdateringar av ledningen
Recent updates
Seeking Alpha • Oct 13
Bed Bath & Beyond: Potential Acceleration Of Largest Debt Tranche Could Cause Liquidity Crisis
Summary Bond market is pricing in near-term bankruptcy, but secured creditors still providing liquidity. Management confirms they are considering distressed debt exchange, but doesn't seem to have detailed consequences of failure with specificity. Rating agency highlights true situation. Little likely to be left to shareholders. Financial stress & bankruptcy risk both increasing. Bed Bath & Beyond (BBBY) is in deep distress. Their most recent 10-Q ("the 10-Q"), filed 9/29 in respect of their second fiscal quarter (which ended 8/27/22) showed a massive 3-month loss of $366 million, compared to the prior loss of $73 million (all comparisons are to the quarter ending 8/28/21), a per share loss of $4.59, compared to a $0.72 loss, sales of $1.437 billion compared to $1.985 billion, negative cashflow (capex & operating) of $809 million compared to negative $103 million, and a debt load of $1.730 billion compared to $1.180 billion. This actually understates the debt since BBBY reveals in the 10-Q that they borrowed an additional $175 million subsequent to 8/27/22 and so the debt load is now $1.905 billion. The shareholders' deficit/negative net worth as of 8/27/22 stood at $577 million while there was a positive balance of $934 million at the end of the comparable period. The company has parted with its former CEO, Mr. Mark Tritton, and, more unfortunately, with its CFO, Mr. Gustavo Arnal, who recently committed suicide. In fact, BBBY is in such deep trouble that new "going concern" language has been added to the 10-Q. BBBY Q2 22 10-Q (BBBY Investor Relations) This language is typically added to filings by management where there is sufficient risk of a company being unable to pay its debts over the next 12 months that management is required to perform a review of cashflows and balances specifically focussed on that risk. It is not standard and has not appeared in BBBY's previous filings. Here, for example, is the comparable section of the immediately preceding (filed 6/30/22) 10-Q. BBBY Q1 22 10-Q (BBBY Investor Relations) In addition, it appears that BBBY has had trouble complying with some of its loan covenants. These are not financial covenants - they refer to the perfection of security over some of its pledged assets - and the problems appear to have been solved, since the lenders have now waived the defaults. However, this is extremely risky behavior for a company in financial distress, since allowing the company to go into default effectively gave lenders a right to accelerate the debt. Waiver of defaults (Loan amendment attached to BBBY Q2 10-Q ) The bond market has reacted violently to BBBY's situation with the yield of BBBY's near-term bonds (8/24) rising from around 5% annualized in March to almost 90% annualized today. BBBY 8/24 Note yield (IBKR) This price level implies not only default before bond maturity (8/24), but also limited recovery for bondholders, and, by extension, nothing for shareholders. However, BBBY still has about $850 million in liquidity (as of the end of September), according to management's statements on the Q2 conference call. So why are the credit markets pricing in disaster? To understand this, we have to look at the structure of BBBY's debt. Debt details BBBY Balance Sheet (BBBY Investor Relations) Although BBBY's $5.2 billion of liabilities are comprised of more than just debt, it is the debt which is of most interest in determining BBY's near term prospects. Most of the other long-term liabilities are operating lease liabilities to the landlords of their stores which are off-set by the operating lease right-to-use assets and thus will largely disappear if and when BBBY returns the stores or landlords take them back. BBBY currently has two important classes of debt outstanding - senior secured & senior unsecured. Let's review each in turn. Unsecured: The unsecured debt consists of three tranches of notes (the "Notes"). All were issued in August 2014 pursuant to the same indenture (the "Base Indenture"), which can be found among the July 2014 filings on BBBY's investor relations page. The tranches come due in the Augusts of 2024, 2034 & 2044, and were originally in the amounts $300 million, $300 million and $900 million respectively. BBBY has (in more prosperous times) repurchased some of the notes and so the outstandings (according to IBKR) are now $284.4 million for 2024 (the "Near Tranche"), and $225 million for 2034 & $675 million for 2044 (together the "Longer Tranches"). Secured: The secured debt currently consists of two portions - an asset-based loan (the "ABL") and a first-in last-out loan (the "FILO"). Both are secured against BBBY's (a) inventories, (b) credit card receivables and (c) some of the cash deposits (collectively, the "Collateral"). The ABL is a revolving credit facility (so can be drawn, repaid & drawn again) and can also be used to provide guarantees of BBBY's liabilities (e.g. by letters of credit issued to suppliers). At the end of August, 2022, the secured debt facility was amended and substantially expanded. The ABL was increased from $1 billion to $1.13 billion and the $375 million FILO loan (which had previously been contemplated but not committed) was agreed, executed and, at the beginning of September, drawn in full. The then-CFO announced the amendment in a press release on 8/31, filed with SEC on 9/01 (the "8-K Filing"). Here are the relevant portions. BBBY 9/01 8-K extract (author's highlight) (sec.gov) This change, together with management's expectation of a reduction in cash burn, has been widely credited among retail investors (judging by Twitter, Reddit and stocktwits.com) with providing BBBY a path to avoid bankruptcy. Although cash burn continued at a rate of roughly $150 million per month in September (as shown by the $1 billion of liquidity as of 9/01 in the Q2 investor presentation, and the $0.85 billion as of 9/27 announced in the Q2 conference call (the "Q2 Call")), management's announced objective of cashflow break-even by February (end FY22) and the increased availability of funds under the amended ABL suggested to many that BBBY will be able to last until at least 8/2026 (the scheduled maturity of the amended ABL) - past the 8/24 repayment of the $284.4 million of the Near Tranche Notes, and so giving management plenty of time to restructure the company and, possibly, realize substantial value from the spin-off of their flagship buybuy BABY brand. BBBY management H2 2022 outlook (BBBY Q2 investor presentation) The bond market, however, has not been so sanguine, with the price of the Near Tranche Note falling in price to only 30.938 cents on the dollar as of Oct 7. 2024 Bond Price (IBKR) This is despite the fact that management announced that they were considering a purchase or exchange of the Near Term Notes. BBBY Q2 10-Q p33 (sec.gov) Shareholders who, based on the above, believed that BBBY was planning to open a voluntary tender/exchange offer for the Near Term Notes will have been surprised to read in the Wall Street Journal on October 3 (the "WSJ Article") that the Note holders were worried about a "potentially coercive" exchange. Moody's rating On Friday, October 7, Moody's downgraded BBBY's corporate family rating to Ca and the Notes to C. Here is how Moody's defines C. Moody's C Rating (Moody's Investors Service) But why did Moody's do that? There are only $284.4 million of the Notes coming due over the next few years, and, as discussed above, BBBY has $850 million of liquidity. The answer lies in the last paragraph of the downgrade press release. Moody's downgrade extract (Moody's Investors Service) This accelerating maturity date was not detailed in the 10-Q by management. However, if we go back to an earlier filing (the 8/2021 previous amendment to the ABL), we find this: ABL Acceleration Clause (BBBY 8/21 8-K filing) So the ABL may come due in May 2024 - much earlier than scheduled - and probably the FILO as well (we do not know the full current details of the current ABL/FILO terms & conditions, since the annexes to the latest ABL amendment, which document those terms, do not seem to be in the 10-Q, and I cannot find them elsewhere - for the purposes of this article I am assuming that they track, or, at least, are no more lax than the August 2021 amendment). Can BBBY generate the approximately $1.5 billion cash necessary to repay them. I do not believe so. Remember BBBY have told us (in the Q2 Call & associated presentation) they just hope to break-even in Q4 and since (due to BBBY's somewhat idiosyncratic fiscal year) Q4 includes not only the Christmas season and the January sales, but also part of the Thanksgiving/Black Friday season, it seems likely that other quarters will be worse. Chicken This sets up a multi-million dollar game of chicken between the holders of the Near Tranche Notes and BBBY management. The Near Tranche holders know that management MUST buy the great majority of the Near Tranche Notes because the consequence of them not doing so is that the $1.5 billion ABL & FILO will come due in May 2024. If that happened & BBBY does not repay the ABL, the ABL & FILO lenders could seize the Collateral, and no mass-market retailer can survive without inventory. Therefore the Near Term Tranche holders can hold out for a higher price. On the other hand, if management pays too much, they run the risk of having insufficient cash to make the periodic amortization payments under the FILO loan which, as the 8-K filing described, amount to approximately $4.6875 million per quarter commencing 2/23, and so causing default/acceleration of the ABL & the FILO. As described above, management told us, in the 10-Q, that they are planning to offer to buy back the Near Tranche, but, so far as this author can establish, they did NOT specifically spell out the potentially disastrous consequences of failing to do so in the 10-Q or anywhere else.. Chicken with extra spice To add extra drama to this face-off, there is another factor to consider. We have not yet considered the holders of the Longer Tranches. They face the risk that $1.13 billion of ABL, $375 million of FILO loan and whatever is necessary to buy/redeem the Near Term Notes are all extracted from the company before they get paid. (Unusually, the Base Indenture does not provide for default/acceleration of the Longer Tranches upon a distressed exchange of the Near Tranche Notes, or even upon default/acceleration of the ABL/FILO/Near Tranche - only bankruptcy, or default under the Longer Tranche Notes themselves will allow acceleration of those tranches). It is likely that the Longer Tranche Note holders will take steps to mitigate this risk. Probably some of the Longer Tranche Note holders (generally institutions or bond funds) already hold some of the Near Tranche Notes. It would not be hard for them to combine those holding with Notes acquired in the market to reach $50 million of Near Tranche face value (which would only cost $15.469 million at October 7's prices). That would put them in a position to demand concessions for their longer-term holding - perhaps even pari passu treatment - in order for them to allow the repurchase to continue and avoid ABL/FILO acceleration. So instead of buying back $284.4 million of Notes, BBBY would be forced to repurchase $1.1844 billion. Consequences to noteholders The Note holders have come off badly in the recent creation & expansion of the Secured debt. The original ABL, signed in June 2020, was for $850 million. As described in the 10-Q, this was expanded to $1 billion in 8/21 and to $1.505 billion (including the FILO) in 8/22. All this secured debt is now ahead of them in the line for BBBY's assets, but also, by means of the accelerating maturity date added in 8/21, the ABL (and probably the FILO) have leap-frogged the Near Tranche Notes in the maturity structure. They have some leverage, as described above, in their negotiations with the company, I believe that ultimately they have the weaker position. I do not suggest that they will get nothing - I am sure a substantial payment will be made to them, but if they push too far, they will be left with almost nothing since, as the company says, the ABL and the FILO are secured against substantially all of the company's assets, and so little will be left to unsecured lenders in a liquidation.Seeking Alpha • Sep 26
Bed Bath & Beyond Even Less Compelling Now
Summary My timing is sometimes awful, and nothing demonstrates this fact better than my recent sale of Bed Bath & Beyond. BBBY stock price is higher today, but I'm of the view that that proves nothing. This is still a bad investment until there's some evidence of a turnaround. Interestingly (to me, anyway), the puts I wrote did much less badly than my small stock position here. This demonstrates yet again the lower-risk nature of these instruments. I've written it before, and no doubt I'll write it again. Those people who've had the misfortune to see me dance know that my timing isn't always perfect. With that in mind, I want to write about Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. (BBBY) again. In February of this year, I took a small, speculative position in the company at a price just under $16. About five months later, I abandoned the stock at a price just over $5, as my view of the company deteriorated from "troubled" to "very troubled." People sell stocks at losses all the time, though. It's been said that the world's greatest investors are correct barely more than 50% of the time. The situation here became downright insulting for me, though. Immediately after I sold my shares, the stock rocketed to just over $23, before crashing back to the current price of ~$6.65. Had my timing been much better, and had I waited five weeks, I could have sold my tiny stake at a nice profit. There are three ideas that I want to explore in this article, so I'm about to explore three ideas in this article. The first of these involves using stock price as proof of anything. The second involves trying to now work out whether Bed Bath & Beyond is a good buy or not. The third involves me droning on, yet again, about how short put options are great at reducing risk and enhancing returns. It's time, yet again, for me to offer up my "thesis statement" paragraph for my readers. I offer this service to readers as a way for them to save time. The thesis statement paragraph offers them the highlights of my arguments at the beginning of the article, which then gives them the option to avoid wading through my weaselly justifications for a given decision. There's no need to thank me or throw around words like "hero" and "saintly" for this. Knowing that I'm making the lives of my readers just a bit brighter is thanks enough for me. That written, I wouldn't object to a bronze statue commissioned in my honor. I'm of the view that it's very common for investors to use stock price itself to justify a position, and that is a very flabby argument, especially on a site such as this. Bed Bath & Beyond is even less compelling an investment now than it was when I abandoned the name some months ago. I could be persuaded to buy back in, but I'd need to see some significant improvements in the overall economy. In particular, I'd need to see inventory levels come down, as I think the probability of a write-down increases by the day. This will sink the already terrible earnings here. Finally, the put options I wrote previously did less badly than the stock. This highlights the fact that even in the case of what was obviously an unmitigated disaster, puts are the safer instrument. Does Price "Prove" Anything? We are a very diverse crowd of people who come to this website. Some of us are young, some of us are much more advanced in years. Some of us are "outdoorsey" and the some among us are very much "indoorsey." Some of us like playing football, and the coolest among us prefer playing Dungeons & Dragons. Some of us like one very popular carbonated soft drink, others prefer a slightly different tasting carbonated soft drink, and so on. Forgive the tautology, but the one thing that we all have in common is that we're here, on this site, to "seek alpha." The foundational philosophy of this site is that a stock's price is often "wrong." The whole point of this enterprise, the thing that attracts upwards of a dozen readers to my articles, for instance, is that we're trying to spot discrepancies between "price" and "worth." Given that you're on a site that has this as a foundational principle, dear readers, you're on very shaky rhetorical ground when you use price to try to prove the rightness or wrongness of a given call. I've experienced this in my writings a few times over the years. You put out a call on a given stock, the price moves against you, and the crowd starts roaring about how naive you were for buying/selling prematurely. The crowd eventually goes silent, either when your views are vindicated, or when subsequent articles displace yours. The troublesome thing about this phenomenon, in my view, is that when readers use price itself as "proof", they're doing themselves a disservice. This is because what the market giveth, the market taketh awayeth just as quickly. This was the case with the stock of Bed Bath & Beyond when it "roman candled" to the mid-$20s, only to crash back down again. So, lesson one to readers on this site would be: you're on a site that is philosophically opposed to the idea that price proves anything, so act accordingly. There's a decent chance that a call can be wrong, but price change demonstrates nothing. Bed Bath & Beyond Update The company hasn't reported financials since I last wrote about them, so there's no real financial update this time. For those who missed my latest missive on this name, I'll offer the highlights of my take on the financials: Sales and net income evaporated during the most recent quarter. Revenue was off by about 25%, and net income fell from a loss of $50.8 million to $358 million. The comparison year (2021) wasn't anomalously good, so the recent results were abnormally bad. As of the latest financial reports, the company is making about 43% less money than it did prior to the pandemic. The capital structure, too, has deteriorated massively, with long-term debt up by $197 million, or 16.7% relative to the same time last year. Merchandise inventory was about 12.5% higher than the same time last year, and sat at about $1.76 billion, raising the specter of a fairly massive write-down. Now that we're all up to speed about the most recent financial performance, it's time to review the valuation. As I've written many times on this site, I'm very comfortable buying a so-called "cigar butt" if the valuation is right. Put another way, a very troubled company like this one can be a great investment if you pick it up at a sufficiently cheap price. The Stock When I got out of this stock previously, the shares were trading at a price-to-sales ratio of ~.064. Obviously, I couldn't review the price to earnings or price to free cash flow, because those are both distant memories at this point. Anyway, fast-forward to the present, and I'll admit that the shares are very near the lowest in history, which is compelling. The market is paying less for $1 of future sales than they ever have. That said, the shares are actually about 31% more expensive than they were when I left the stock during the summer.Seeking Alpha • Sep 15
Bed Bath & Beyond lists first 56 stores slated for closure
Bed Bath & Beyond (NASDAQ:BBBY) provided a detailed list of locations it plans to close as part of its effort to cut costs. Bed Bath (BBBY) listed 56 locations slated for closure including locations in Stamford, Connecticut, Paramus, New Jersey, Tucson, Arizona and Sandusky, Ohio, according to a posting on the retailer's website. The list comes after Bed Bath (BBBY) late last month said it planned to close about 150 lower-producing Bed Bath & Beyond banner stores and cut 20% of jobs across the corporate and supply chain The company said it expected its actions to reduce SG&A by approximately $250 million in fiscal 2022.Seeking Alpha • Aug 31
Bed Bath & Beyond slides on proposed stock offering
Bed Bath & Beyond (NASDAQ:BBBY) shares dropped pre-market on Wednesday after the home goods retailer filed for an offering of common stock. Terms of the offering, including size and pricing, are yet to be determined. The retailer plans to offer, issue and sell shares of its common stock together or separately and in one or more series. Net proceeds from any sale would be used for general corporate purposes, which may include repayment of our indebtedness, future repurchases of our common stock and financing possible acquisitions. Proceeds may also be invested temporarily in short-term marketable securities or applied to repay short-term debt until they are used for their stated purpose. BBBY shares are down ~19% pre-market As previously announced, the retailer will hold a conference call today (August 31) to provide a business and strategic updateSeeking Alpha • Aug 23
Bed Bath & Beyond: Beyond Reorganization
Bed Bath & Beyond is likely prepping a liquidating Chapter 11 in the next 30 days. The company has exhausted its liquidity and requires new money DIP financing to preserve the value of its bankruptcy estate. A Buy Buy Baby 363 sale will not save holders of Bed Bath & Beyond common shares, who will recover 0% in bankruptcy. Bed Bath & Beyond's senior unsecured notes are currently undervalued if a Buy Buy Baby 363 sale fetches at least a couple hundred million. Bed Bath & Beyond (BBBY) is likely on the verge of filing for bankruptcy in the coming weeks. BBBY's management team made serious mistakes by heavily reweighting its core brand's inventory mix to favor private label and buying back common shares at a premium in the middle of a liquidity crunch. The Buy Buy Baby brand is not worth billions of dollars, as Ryan Cohen had suggested earlier this year. Buy Buy Baby's revenue declined last quarter, making it likely that it won't even sell for the ~$900 million valuation suggested by Wedbush months ago. The only path forward for BBBY is to liquidate all of its assets at fire-sale prices, in order to maximize recovery value for its creditors. A reorganization of BBBY is not remotely viable, given the substantial, increasing BBBY's ongoing cash burn and its core brand's declining brand equity in face of weak consumer sentiment and an unhelpful macro climate. A temporary short squeeze will not spare the company from filing Chapter 11 or delay it, like we saw with GameStop (GME), due to BBBY's severely weak asset coverage. Typically, we would provide more extensive credit research than this. However, for the sake of time - given how imminent a bankruptcy filing is - we are sharing our illustrative hypothetical bankruptcy recovery model, and won't further expound on the factors leading to the demise of BBBY and its current situation. Recovery Model Without A Successful Buy Buy Baby 363 Sale Hadrian Capital Management Analysis Hadrian Capital Management Analysis Recovery Model With A Buy Buy Baby Sale Hadrian Capital Management Analysis Hadrian Capital Management Analysis The above numbers are hypothetical and for illustrative purposes only. We would be surprised if BBBY manages to obtain $250 million of new money financing through a debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing facility, as the company will likely pursue a liquidating Chapter 11 rather than reemerge through a reorganization of existing indebtedness. However, we came up with this amount as a placeholder, which would give the company additional liquidity to wind down its operations in bankruptcy and enough time to sell off the Buy Buy Baby brand in a 363 sale, while maximizing the recovery value of Bed Bath & Beyond's estate. No matter how you slice the onion, pre-petition equity claims will be expunged and extinguished in a Chapter 11 proceeding with no recovery value, given all the claims that will rank priority to equity claim holders. There will be no come back story for investors betting on a short squeeze in BBBY's common stock.Seeking Alpha • Aug 16
Bed Bath & Beyond: Massive Short Squeeze Could Be Coming Soon
Bed Bath & Beyond is ready for an epic short squeeze due to its low float, high short interest, and growing retail investor interest. Billionaire Ryan Cohen bought a 9.8% stake in the company back in March 2022 and BBBY has made several key changes to turn the company around. BBBY is the #1 trending stock ticker on reddit WallStreetBets and could soar just like GameStop did in January 2021. During my high growth stock research, I came across Bed Bath & Beyond (BBBY) and noticed a massive opportunity for a huge short and gamma squeeze. This isn't just some stock pick that could go up 50% or 100% over the next few months. I truly believe BBBY is like GameStop 2.0 and could make money for smart investors who recognize the opportunity and take action. Business Overview Bed Bath & Beyond is an American based home and kitchen retail chain that sells things you would need for your bedroom, kitchen, or dorm room. Bed Bath & Beyond was a struggling niche retail chain that experienced the "Amazon Effect" when Cohen bought his initial stake. However, the company is beginning its current turnaround with new CEO Sue Grove. She bought 50,000 BBBY shares under $5 and could help transform the company's declining revenue and same-store sales. In Q1 2022, BBBY comparable same-store sales fell 24% and revenue fell to $1.46 billion. The company is drowning in $3.28 billion in debt with only $107 million in cash on its balance sheet. BBBY soared to $30 in March 2022, but shares are currently down 11% YTD. BBBY data by YCharts So what caused the March 2022 BBBY stock price? A billionaire activist investor bought a huge stake in the company. His name is Ryan Cohen. The Ryan Cohen Effect Ryan Cohen is a Canadian billionaire activist investor who is famously known for his helping hand in the GME stock boom last year. He purchased 7,780,000 BBBY shares with 16,701 call options expiring on January 20 2023 at $60 to $80 strike prices. If exercised, Ryan Cohen would own 9,450,100 BBBY shares, giving him an 11.8% stake in the company. BBBY stock has many similarities to the GME squeeze, so I've considered going all-in on the stock: Both BBBY and GME stock traded as low as $5 Ryan Cohen only owns 2 stocks in his RC Ventures portfolio: GME and BBBY Retail investors got behind GME to send it to the moon. BBBY is gaining massive social media attention recently. GME had a high short interest and got bashed in mainstream media before the squeeze happened. Many media pundits (Jim Cramer) are now attacking BBBY. GME had 76 million shares outstanding in January 2021 before the 2022 4 to 1 stock split. BBBY has 75 million shares outstanding as of August 2022. The similarities are frightening but what I like the most is that Ryan Cohen is a long term investor and hasn't sold a single BBBY share or call option. Ryan Cohen's BBBY Stock & Options Purchases Here's a chart listing all of his stock & call options purchases: Transaction # of Securities Average Cost Date Purchase of Common Stock 1,000,000 14.769 01/13/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 500,000 15.286 01/14/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 300,717 14.393 01/20/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 99,283 13.076 01/21/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 50,000 14.91 01/25/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 200,000 15.048 01/26/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 251,336 13.844 01/27/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 440,981 14.489 01/28/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 44,333 16.581 01/31/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 609,941 16.471 01/31/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 187,962 16.976 02/01/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 156,574 17.102 02/02/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 75,000 16.079 02/04/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 83,873 16.278 02/07/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 70,000 15.823 02/14/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 30,000 16.228 02/16/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 75,000 14.031 02/22/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 367,833 15.206 02/24/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 500,000 13.66 02/24/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 500,000 14.577 02/24/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 300,000 13.426 02/24/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 542,621 16.223 02/25/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 115,000 16.114 02/25/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 500,000 16.601 02/28/2022 Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($60 Exercise Price)* 4,757 0.9324 02/28/2022 Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($75 Exercise Price)* 243 0.7603 02/28/2022 Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($60 Exercise Price)* 5,000 1.4693 03/01/2022 Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($60 Exercise Price)* 1,500 1.4115 03/01/2022 Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($75 Exercise Price)* 201 1.0803 03/01/2022 Purchase of January 2023 Call Option ($80 Exercise Price)* 5,000 0.7103 03/01/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 307,341 16.9429 03/01/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 311,660 16.7564 03/01/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 70,545 16.68 03/01/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 69,516 17.254 03/02/2022 Purchase of Common Stock 20,484 16.809 03/03/2022 His average BBBY cost basis is $15.34 yet BBBY shares are trading at a 16% discount as of August 15 2022. That means savvy investors can open a BBBY position at a cheaper price than Cohen did back in March 2022. It's likely not too late to invest in BBBY stock if you truly stand behind Ryan Cohen. BBBY Stock is Undervalued The best way to evaluate BBBY is to look at similar retail companies and compare their valuations. BBBY stock is significantly undervalued, possibly partly due to all the short selling recently. Company Price to Sales Ratio Bed Bath & Beyond 0.16 GameStop 1.94 Walmart (WMT) 0.63 Target (TGT) 0.77 Ross Stores (ROST) 1.62 GME trades at 15 times higher P/S ratio than BBBY. It's one of the lowest valuations across the entire retail industry and screams undervalued to the astute investor. I've never seen a company generate over $7 billion in annual revenue yet trade at such a low valuation. No wonder Ryan Cohen bought a massive stake. Billionaires buy assets on sale when nobody else wants them akin to Warren Buffett's value investing strategy. How High Can BBBY Go? GME stock traded around $4 then soared to as high as $480 in January 2021. At the time, GME stock had a high short interest and caused an epic short squeeze that cost short sellers billions of dollars. According to Ortex, BBBY has a short interest of 47%. GameStop hit $480 during its peak in 2021 and I believe BBBY shares could soar to triple digits within the next few weeks. My BBBY price prediction is $250 per share with the potential for $500 if BBBY follows the exact same path GameStop did. I used a P/S ratio model coupled with improved brand awareness now that Ryan Cohen and the Wall Street Bets crowd are behind the stock. Bed Bath & Beyond would need to achieve positive comparable same-store sales, boost average revenue per store, and revive its brand to compete with Walmart (WMT) and Target (TGT) for customers. Ryan Cohen has a "Midas Touch" when it comes to niche retailers. He succeeded with Chewy (CHWY) and GameStop. Is it smart to bet against him this time around? If BBBY stock achieves a similar P/S ratio of 1.94, that would put BBBY stock at $192 per share.Seeking Alpha • Aug 10
Bed Bath & Beyond: To The Moon Again
Bed Bath & Beyond returns as a retail-favorite meme mania stock. Even though BBBY's underlying business model continues to struggle to adapt to the current environment. BBBY's valuation makes it very difficult to quantify. It may look cheap on a trailing basis, but as we look ahead, cheap-to-start-with can end up even cheaper. But are we all overthinking this whole situation? Perhaps this goes to the moon? In the short term, Mr. Market rules the day. Investment Thesis Bed Bath & Beyond (BBBY) once again picks up retail interest as a meme mania stock. The backdrop? The worse the company's prospects, the more crowded the short side becomes, and the more attractive it becomes as a meme stock. While there's really nothing wrong with speculating on meme stocks. It does not lead to the path to financial independence. Avoid this stock. A BBBY Meme Stock, Again? In the past month, BBBY has seen its stock soar 100%, including the 14% sell-off in yesterday's market. The reason for the sudden uptick? I believe that BBBY has seen a significant amount of short-covering. As a reminder, BBBY's stock is approximately 40% shorted. Indeed, a theme that has picked up over the last few weeks where the most ''hated'' business models, with the most crowded shorts, have seen algos covering their short positions. And as more and more shorts covered their positions, this led to retail traders picking up stocks such as BBBY and running with them. And this leads me to discuss the current market environment we find ourself in. The problem with investing is also its biggest opportunity. In the short term, it's all about perception. Psychology plays a significant role in how an investor positions themselves. And a change in psychology can lead to a rapid change in investment flows towards a stock. And then, to compound matters, together with a change in psychology, a stock that was formerly left-for-dead, becomes a stock that is suddenly ''perceived'' to be a value stock. This culminates in a lollapalooza that suddenly catches upward momentum. This leads to an overwhelming urge from shareholders to hold on to see if indeed BBBY's stock goes to the moon. Investors start to believe that Bed Bath is something that it's not. The business has been struggling for years. Even if during the Covid period, we can see in hindsight, that it had a period of abnormal prosperity. After all, we were all stuck at home with too few outlets to spend cash outside of our homes. And now? Looking ahead BBBY is likely to be little more than a trading sardine. Revenue Growth Rates Stay Negative BBBY revenue growth rates BBBY's Q1 2022 saw -23% comparable sales growth. This figure is a no-gimmicks, nowhere to hide, clean comparable figure to the same period a year ago. Even though I recognize that BBBY was up against a very challenging comparable with last year. However, the fact of the matter is that the Board clearly recognizes that BBBY isn't making enough progress to gain market share or even to remain a viable business, which led to CEO Mark Tritton stepping aside recently after slightly over two years at the helm of this business. But there again, I pause and ask, am I overthinking what's at play here? BBBY Stock Valuation -- Difficult to Quantify From where I see things, BBBY is an overleveraged business with declining sales.Analysartikel • Aug 08
Bed Bath & Beyond's (NASDAQ:BBBY) Short Squeeze may be Risky, but the New Business Model has a Chance
It seems that most of the bad performance of Bed Bath & Beyond (NASDAQ:BBBY) is attributable to the negative performance history after 2019. The stock is beaten down by short-selling, with some 35% of shares being shorted by July 14th, 2022, and analysts are also posting low price targets for the stock which has driven it to a multi-year low valuation.Seeking Alpha • Jul 30
Bed Bath & Beyond: Inflation Is Its Best Friend
Clear evidence from retail EPS reports prove that consumers are spending more on store brands than previously due to unprecedented levels of inflation. Store brands have higher margins according to retailers; BBBY has shifted its focus from branded to private label offerings. Street Consensus is very negative due to prior performance issues, but we believe the shift to store brands is right in BBBY's sweet spot. The stock is cheap, fundamentals reflect past performance issues and our technical analysis of the chart shows considerable upside potential. White Label Strategy Could Be About To Payoff Big Time We believe Bed Bath & Beyond (BBBY) is well-positioned to take advantage of powerful shifts in consumer behavior driven by surging inflation with its store brands strategy, developed over the last three years. Management took a big risk starting in 2019 to shift to so-called private-label products, or store brands. BBBY resells these off-label products through its own store brands for higher margins than it gets for national branded products. The results through the May (last) quarter were disappointing and precipitated a change in CEOs, according to company filings. According to a Forbes article, former CEO Tritton "tried to replicate a strategy that had been profitable for other retailers — selling private label products (knock offs of popular brands at a lower price)." A recent WSJ story highlighted customer feedback that changes went too far and too fast, which alienated traditional BBBY shoppers. We think that nearly 20% inflation (based on 1980 measures) is driving a powerful surge in customers buying cheaper store brands to make ends meet. BBBY is well positioned to capitalize on this shift in consumer buying behavior, made necessary by rising costs. Bed, Bath & Beyond 10K S&P Global Market Intelligence Pandemic-related disruptions worked against BBBY, but the return to stores this summer and fall could power significant upside potential relative to a very bearish Street Consensus. The big COVID winners in retail were players that could rapidly shift to online sales and fulfillment. Ample evidence of this can be seen by reviewing prior 10Qs for McDonald's (MCD) and Amazon (AMZN). BBBY failed badly in this category over the last 2 years, per the WSJ story. With a meaningful return to normalcy last Spring, and continuing over the Summer and into the Fall, we increasingly believe that BBBY will be positioned to take advantage of newly price-sensitive customers that have little choice but to reduce spending amidst soaring price inflation that was less than 1% 15 months ago. From Walmart's earnings call: The increasing levels of food and fuel inflation are affecting how customers spend, and while we’ve made good progress clearing hardline categories, apparel in Walmart U.S. is requiring more markdown dollars. We’re now anticipating more pressure on general merchandise in the back half. We believe BBBY’s operational weakness that hurt results over the last two years as COVID made customers prefer online and takeout purchasing may have become the company’s greatest strength now that management has revamped its supply chain, technology and product line issues. The WSJ cites a McKinsey & Co survey that shows 90% of respondents planning to buy white-label products would continue to do so after the pandemic was over. We think inflation will accelerate that trend in spades. Peerless Progress BBBY’s 955 stores are well-positioned to answer surging customer demand for lower price items just as many retailers such as Amazon are cutting back on private label offerings. Many retailers have grown in-store brands to almost a third of sales, per the WSJ. Retailers like Walgreens (WAG) and Kroger (KOG) have increased the amount of white-label offerings recently. Walmart and Target (TGT) noted significant slowdowns in spending, but spending shifts led to some areas of strength (white-label good). Per Target's earnings call: In our other three core merchandise categories: apparel, home, and hard lines, we saw a rapid slowdown in the year-over-year sales trends beginning in March, when we began to annualize the impact of last year's stimulus payments ...Nevertheless, we're still seeing healthy overall spending by our guests, even as their spending continues to evolve. Others like Amazon are backing off private-label offerings for a variety of reason including seller complaints about predatory behaviors. This comes just as surveys and earnings season feedback from retailers support our view that consumers have little choice but to spend less, which translates into buying more white-label products. Our direct research supports the notion that the timing could be fortuitous for BBBY investors. Fundamentals It has been widely reported that Bed Bath & Beyond is struggling with falling sales, reduced liquidity and increased debt loads, but we think that is old news. SA’s Quant model rates the stock’s growth potential as 'A'. We would agree but only because of what we hear from stores that we have contacted that inflation is driving more and more customers to their white label offerings. Further evidence shows up in the news that consumers have shifted to lower priced store brands in large numbers. Our calls to stores and onsite visits suggest that private label (typically outsourced from branded manufacturers and sold as store brands) products are cheaper than branded ones, though also somewhat lesser quality. Nielson.comSeeking Alpha • Jul 05
Bed Bath & Beyond: This Time It's Different
Following the meme stock frenzy, BBBY has returned to the March 2020 lows due to operational challenges and could now represent a highly compelling turn-around pick. Management continues to struggle to right the ship, and BBBY seems to be in a constant turn-around mode. Since 2018, sales and profitability have only known one direction – down. Most importantly, BBBY is now operating from a very weak base, whereas during the Great Recession it operated from a position of strength. The recent insider purchases are not meaningful and I might even go so far as to call them window dressing transactions - two insiders bought back some of the shares they had sold in mid-2021 at twice the price. At $4.7, there is a lot of risk priced into the stock, but given BBBY's extremely weak position in the highly competitive landscape of brick-and-mortar retailers, I decided to pass. Investment Thesis Bed Bath & Beyond (BBBY) is a home furnishings retailer operating primarily in the U.S., but also in Canada, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. The company currently has a little less than 1,000 stores, consisting of Bed Bath & Beyond, Buy Buy Baby and Harmon Face Values, the latter of which is probably less well-known and offers branded and private label personal care and beauty products at a good value. I have analyzed the company in 2018, when it already announced an updated strategy aiming at a cleaner shopping experience, better omnichannel experience, and streamlined inventories. BBBY still appears to be in turn-around mode, however, and provided another updated strategy in late 2020, when the company was still licking its wounds of the pandemic and related government-mandated store closures. In the midst of the Meme stock frenzy, buyers drove the stock price to $45, and I briefly felt like I had missed out, having sold my position much earlier. However, fears of a recession and waning interest in Meme stocks brought the share price back to more meaningful levels, and it has even been testing the March 2020 lows. The most recent decline is largely due to the departure of former CEO Mark Tritton, who obviously failed to successfully turn the company around - BBBY recently reported a 23% comparable sales decline for the first quarter of fiscal 2022 and margins continue to contract. Since peaking in mid-2021, BBBY's share price has fallen nearly 90%, so one might rightly ask whether the stock is now a compelling deep value pick. After all, the company is trading at just 0.05 times fiscal 2021 sales. In this article, I will explain why I decided against investing in the company, even though it is exceptionally cheap, at least from the perspective of price-to-sales. Margins Are A Company’s Lifeblood As a retailer, it is not surprising that BBBY operates on relatively thin margins. However, when I analyzed the company four years ago, BBBY's level of margin erosion was already quite advanced as the company continued to rely on discount membership programs, engaging in a race to the bottom with e-commerce giants like Amazon (AMZN). Management was likely looking for the easy way out to stabilize its sales rather than transforming the shopping experience at BBBY in a timely manner, thereby creating a small but still important economic moat in the highly competitive retail environment. The company’s lacking operating performance is best illustrated by Figure 1, which shows the historical development of BBBY’s gross margin and sales, general and administrative ((SG&A)) expenses as a percentage of net sales. This is a textbook example of how a company’s financials should not develop. Figure 1: BBBY's gross margin and sales, general and administrative expenses, as a percentage of net sales (own work, based on the company’s fiscal 2006 to fiscal 2021 10-Ks) It is important to note that BBBY was in a much better position during the Great Recession and was actually operating from a position of strength, highlighted by gross margins of well over 40% and SG&A expenses of less than 30% of net sales, resulting in a theoretical operating margin of 10%. In addition, the company had no debt (other than operating and finance lease obligations). During the Great Recession, BBBY's profit margins shrank, but its gross margin stabilized at a very respectable 40%. Most importantly, the company managed to grow sales during these turbulent times, at a compound annual growth rate ((CAGR)) of nearly 6% between fiscal 2006 and fiscal 2009. The years after the Great Recession, BBBY continued to grow its top-line at a – for a retailer – very respectable rate of 5.8% per year on a compounded basis and between fiscal 2006 and fiscal 2017, the year in which sales peaked. However, BBBY's sales growth occurred primarily in the earlier years of the 2010s, and declined since fiscal 2014. Management temporarily stabilized growth in the low single digits by providing quasi-permanent discounts, but sales have been trending downward since fiscal 2018. Poor operational performance and the failure to right the ship in the late 2010s now weigh heavily on BBBY. The company continues to report declining sales ($9.2 billion in fiscal 2020, primarily due to the pandemic, and worse, $7.9 billion in fiscal 2021), and the first quarter of fiscal 2022 does not inspire confidence either, with net sales of about $1.5 billion, a 23% comparable sales decline. Free cash flow ((FCF)) turned negative in fiscal 2021, and it is likely to remain negative or only marginally positive in fiscal 2022, considering that interim CEO Sue Gove has announced aggressive action on inventory (i.e., extended markdowns). It may sound a bit harsh, but the measures announced on slide 7 of the recent earnings presentation give the impression that management waited until the last moment. Obviously, not much has changed for the better since Steven Temares stepped down in 2019. Of course, the pandemic and, in particular, the associated measures to contain the spread of the virus hit retailers like BBBY disproportionately hard. Unlike many of its competitors, however, BBBY failed to capitalize on the opportunities when consumers were finally able to return to the stores. I believe that 2021 was an extremely important year in which consumers learned where to get the best value for their money and the best shopping experience on a reliable basis. Names of retailers like Target (TGT, see my recent article) come to mind. Don’t Be Fooled By Insider Purchases Insider purchases can be a leading indicator of a successful turn-around. BBBY insiders were net buyers of company shares in both fiscal 2020 and fiscal 2021, purchasing $568,008 and $2.54 million worth of shares, respectively. However, I would be careful not to overemphasize these transactions for several reasons. EVP and COO John Hartmann sold 45,000 shares worth $1.4 million in mid-2021, some of which he bought back earlier this year for less than half the price. The fact that he only bought back $100,005 worth of shares suggests this was a window dressing transaction. EVP and Chief Merchandising Officer Joseph Hartsig also sold shares in mid-2021 for $311,285. Like his colleague, he bought shares in January 2022. This transaction can also hardly be considered meaningful, as the value of the shares traded was $68,900 - less than a quarter of the proceeds from the previous sale. In addition to these filings, I examined all other Form 4 filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission ((SEC)) since 2011 to get a sense of BBBY's long-term insider behavior. Including sales related to the exercise of granted options, insiders sold a total of $529 million since the beginning of 2011 (Figure 2). Excluding option-related sales, insiders have still sold a staggering $113 million. Figure 2: Net insider transactions at BBBY; note that the net transaction volumes in 2020 and 2021 are not visible due to their comparatively small size of $0.57 million and $0.79 million, respectively (own work, based on form 4 filings by company insiders and BBBY's weekly closing share price) It may be true that the fact that corporate insiders did not start buying shares until mid-2020 is in itself a positive sign. However, the value of shares purchased ($3.1 million) seems downright paltry compared to the number of shares sold by insiders over the last decade. To be fair, it could be argued that former executives Temares ($146 million) and Castagna ($24 million) accounted for the bulk of the sales transactions. Nevertheless, BBBY continues to struggle to assemble a solid management team, highlighted by the recent departure of CEO Tritton. This is certainly far from an ideal basis for navigating such difficult times. Share Repurchases And The Likelihood Of A Buyout BBBY repurchased a considerable amount of its own shares especially in the early 2010s. Since fiscal 2006, the number of weighted average shares outstanding declined by 65% and as a result, earnings per share increased almost three-fold. However, the buybacks came at a significant cost, as shown in Figure 3 - the timing of the buybacks by management was certainly suboptimal. It may not be entirely fair to call the buybacks pure malinvestments given the company's much better prospects in the early 2010s, but it should still be kept in mind that insiders sold very large amounts of stock during the same period, in fact contradicting the company's capital allocation strategy. It should also be remembered that the company took on $1.5 billion in debt in fiscal 2014. In the same year, the company spent $2.25 billion on share buybacks - at a time when the share price reached its peak of $80. Figure 3: BBBY’s share repurchases since fiscal 2006 (own work, based on the company’s fiscal 2006 to fiscal 2021 10-Ks) With the greatly reduced number of shares outstanding, BBBY could become a takeover target - the company's current market capitalization is only $375 million. However, I do not believe an investment thesis should be formed based on a potential takeover of BBBY, as its enterprise value is still significant. The company is still burdened by the debt it has taken on to finance part of what I believe to be excessive share repurchases, and including operating and finance leases, BBBY's enterprise value is $3.5 billion. The maturity profile of the company's mostly operating lease liabilities (Figure 4) is another reason not to overstate the potential of a buyout. Recent news of Kohl's (KSS), which ended its strategic review of a potential sale due to the "current financing and retail environment" suggests that such transactions could indeed become less common in the future.Analysartikel • Jun 30
Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. (NASDAQ:BBBY) Analysts Just Cut Their EPS Forecasts Substantially
Today is shaping up negative for Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. ( NASDAQ:BBBY ) shareholders, with the analysts delivering a...Seeking Alpha • Jun 29
Bed Bath & Beyond Non-GAAP EPS of -$2.83 misses by $1.44, revenue of $1.46B misses by $50M
Bed Bath & Beyond press release (NASDAQ:BBBY): Q1 Non-GAAP EPS of -$2.83 misses by $1.44. Revenue of $1.46B (-25.1% Y/Y) misses by $50M. Comparable sales of -23%. Shares -4% PM. FY2022 Outlook: Sequential Comparable Sales recovery to occur in the second half of Fiscal 2022 versus the first half of Fiscal 2022 driven by inventory optimization plans, including incremental clearance activity; Adjusted SG&A expense for Fiscal 2022 below last year, reflecting aggressive actions to align cost structure to sales; Capital Expenditures of approximately $300M (from $400M previously), reflecting a minimum reduction of $100M.Seeking Alpha • Jun 13
Bed Bath & Beyond: A Shot At Survival
Gross margins have been negatively affected by supply chain issues. Company-owned brands penetration and declining freight rates are reasons for optimism. Despite its shortcomings, buybuy Baby has an attractive financial profile and has received interest from buyers. A sale of $1B-$1.7B would theoretically increase BBBY's market cap proportionately. Even without the sale, supply chain pressures easing by H2 of FY22 give shares an upside of ~50% based on a FWD EV/EBITDA valuation model.Seeking Alpha • May 27
Bed Bath & Beyond: Declining Sales And Contracting Margins
Sales have declined by double digits, significantly influenced by inventory management problems. Margins have been continuously contracting the last ten years. Inventory in transit or held in ports may significantly impact the firm's liquidity and financial flexibility in the short term. Our rating on the stock is "sell".Seeking Alpha • Apr 13
Bed Bath & Beyond Q4 Earnings: Ouch, But There Is A Silver Lining
BBBY posted disastrous Q4 results. The stock opened down double-digits but recovered its losses intraday. The results were bad but there is a silver lining as well.Seeking Alpha • Mar 29
Bed Bath & Beyond: Evaluating The Prospects Amid The Meme Stock Mania Comeback
The meme stock mania is back, which is a good enough reason to evaluate the prospects for Bed Bath & Beyond. Ryan Cohen's letter to the board of Bed Bath brings to light many challenges faced by the company today. Investors need to assess the threat of a few risks that are looming on the horizon.Analysartikel • Mar 08
Analyzing Insider Transactions can Unlock More Opportunities like Bed Bath & Beyond (NASDAQ:BBBY)
If we described the movement of Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. (Nasdaq: BBBY) stock in the last year or so, it was nothing short of erratic. Yet, facing the profitability issues in the aftermath of 2020, it seems that the company is going through a "buy the rumor, sell the news "cycle.Seeking Alpha • Feb 03
Bed Bath & Beyond: Insider Activity Has Me Intrigued
Bed Bath & Beyond is obviously troubled. That's about as insightful as "water is wet." What's interesting is the insider buying activity. Over the very recent past, people who know this business better than any Wall Street analyst have put nearly $2 million of their own capital to work here. For those still nervous about buying at current prices, the options market is offering very generous premia for deep out of the money puts.Seeking Alpha • Dec 08
Bed Bath & Beyond: On The J. C. Penney Road To Ruin
Many investors appear confident that CEO Mark Tritton can turn Bed Bath & Beyond around, despite a lack of meaningful progress so far. Like J.C. Penney a decade ago, Bed Bath & Beyond is losing market share to stronger rivals like HomeGoods and Target at a frightening pace. Also, like J.C. Penney a decade ago, Bed Bath & Beyond is struggling to wean customers off margin-crushing coupons. Bed Bath & Beyond's $1 billion share buyback will leave the company with little flexibility if Tritton's initiatives fail to fix the business. Investors should avoid Bed Bath & Beyond stock, even though it has a big upside in the unlikely event that the company hits its 2023 financial targets.Analys av ersättningar till VD
| Datum | Total ersättning | Lön | Företagets resultat |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 25 2023 | n/a | n/a | -US$3b |
| Nov 26 2022 | n/a | n/a | -US$1b |
| Aug 27 2022 | n/a | n/a | -US$1b |
| May 28 2022 | n/a | n/a | -US$866m |
| Feb 26 2022 | US$255k | n/a | -US$560m |
| Nov 27 2021 | n/a | n/a | -US$391m |
| Aug 28 2021 | n/a | n/a | -US$190m |
| May 29 2021 | n/a | n/a | US$101m |
| Feb 27 2021 | US$160k | n/a | -US$151m |
| Nov 28 2020 | n/a | n/a | -US$225m |
| Aug 29 2020 | n/a | n/a | -US$188m |
| May 30 2020 | n/a | n/a | -US$545m |
| Feb 29 2020 | US$159k | n/a | -US$614m |
Ersättning vs marknad: Sue s total kompensation ($USD 4.78M ) är över genomsnittet för företag av liknande storlek på US marknaden ($USD 630.36K ).
Ersättning vs inkomst: Ersättningen för Sue har ökat samtidigt som företaget är olönsamt.
VD OCH KONCERNCHEF
Sue Gove (65 yo)
1.3yrs
Anställning
US$4,781,527
Kompensation
Ms. Sue Ellen Gove was Interim Chief Executive Officer at Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. from June 23, 2022 until October 2022. She serves as Chief Executive Officer and President at Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. since O...
Ledningsgrupp
| Namn | Position | Anställning | Kompensation | Ägarskap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CEO, President & Director | 1.3yrs | US$4.78m | 0.015% $ 9.1k | |
| Senior VP of Finance & Chief Accounting Officer | 1.3yrs | US$1.43m | 0.0024% $ 1.4k | |
| Executive VP and Chief People & Culture Officer | 3.1yrs | US$1.40m | 0.0021% $ 1.3k | |
| Executive VP & Brand President of buybuy BABY | 2.8yrs | US$1.39m | 0.0013% $ 770.8 | |
| CFO & Chief Restructuring Officer | less than a year | inga uppgifter | inga uppgifter | |
| Executive VP and Chief Technology & Digital Officer | less than a year | inga uppgifter | 0.0020% $ 1.2k | |
| Head of Treasury | 1.3yrs | inga uppgifter | inga uppgifter | |
| Executive VP | less than a year | inga uppgifter | inga uppgifter | |
| Executive VP and Chief Marketing & Customer Officer | less than a year | inga uppgifter | inga uppgifter | |
| Senior VP of Real Estate & Construction | 3.1yrs | inga uppgifter | inga uppgifter | |
| Senior VP & Chief Supply Chain Officer | 3.1yrs | inga uppgifter | inga uppgifter | |
| Chief Diversity Officer | 2.1yrs | inga uppgifter | inga uppgifter |
1.3yrs
Genomsnittlig anställningstid
56yo
Genomsnittlig ålder
Erfaren ledning: BBBY.Q s ledningsgrupp anses inte vara erfaren ( 1.3 års genomsnittlig anställningstid), vilket föreslår ett nytt team.
Styrelseledamöter
| Namn | Position | Anställning | Kompensation | Ägarskap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CEO, President & Director | 4.4yrs | US$4.78m | 0.015% $ 9.1k | |
| Independent Director | 4.4yrs | US$333.59k | 0.0089% $ 5.5k | |
| Independent Chair of the Board | 4.4yrs | US$496.00k | 0.0094% $ 5.8k | |
| Independent Director | 4.4yrs | US$327.00k | 0.0099% $ 6.1k | |
| Independent Director | 1.6yrs | US$286.91k | 0.0051% $ 3.2k | |
| Independent Director | 4.4yrs | US$315.67k | 0.010% $ 6.3k | |
| Independent Director | 1.6yrs | US$306.91k | 0.0054% $ 3.3k | |
| Independent Director | 4.4yrs | US$306.62k | 0.011% $ 6.7k | |
| Independent Director | less than a year | inga uppgifter | inga uppgifter |
4.4yrs
Genomsnittlig anställningstid
61yo
Genomsnittlig ålder
Erfaren styrelse: BBBY.Q s styrelse anses vara erfaren ( 4.4 års genomsnittlig mandatperiod).
Företagsanalys och finansiella data Status
| Uppgifter | Senast uppdaterad (UTC-tid) |
|---|---|
| Analys av företag | 2023/10/04 19:26 |
| Aktiekurs vid dagens slut | 2023/09/29 00:00 |
| Intäkter | 2023/02/25 |
| Årlig intjäning | 2023/02/25 |
Datakällor
Den data som används i vår företagsanalys kommer från S&P Global Market Intelligence LLC. Följande data används i vår analysmodell för att generera denna rapport. Data är normaliserade vilket kan medföra en fördröjning från det att källan är tillgänglig.
| Paket | Uppgifter | Tidsram | Exempel US-källa |
|---|---|---|---|
| Företagets finansiella ställning | 10 år |
| |
| Analytikernas konsensusuppskattningar | +3 år |
|
|
| Marknadspriser | 30 år |
| |
| Ägarskap | 10 år |
| |
| Förvaltning | 10 år |
| |
| Viktiga utvecklingstendenser | 10 år |
|
* Exempel för amerikanska värdepapper, för icke-amerikanska värdepapper används motsvarande regelverk och källor.
Om inget annat anges är all finansiell data baserad på en årsperiod men uppdateras kvartalsvis. Detta kallas data för efterföljande tolv månader (TTM) eller senaste tolv månader (LTM). Lär dig mer om detta.
Analysmodell och snöflinga
Detaljer om analysmodellen som användes för att skapa den här rapporten finns på vår Github-sida, vi har också guider om hur du använder våra rapporter och tutorials på Youtube.
Lär dig mer om det team i världsklass som utformade och byggde analysmodellen Simply Wall St.
Industri- och sektormått
Våra bransch- och sektionsmått beräknas var sjätte timme av Simply Wall St, detaljer om vår process finns tillgängliga på Github.
Källor för analytiker
Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. bevakas av 32 analytiker. av dessa analytiker lämnade de uppskattningar av intäkter eller resultat som användes som indata till vår rapport. Analytikernas inskickade estimat uppdateras löpande under dagen.
| Analytiker | Institution |
|---|---|
| Christopher Graja | Argus Research Company |
| Alan Rifkin | Barclays |
| Michael Lasser | Barclays |