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FAST Acquisition Corp.NYSE:FST Rapporto sulle azioni

Cap. di mercato US$254.5m
Prezzo delle azioni
n/a
Il mio valore equo
Non disponibile
1Y-17.9%
7D-1.2%
1D
Valore del portafoglio
Vista

FAST Acquisition Corp.

Report azionario NYSE:FST

Capitalizzazione di mercato: US$254.5m

This company listing is no longer active

This company may still be operating, however this listing is no longer active. Find out why through their latest events.

FAST Acquisition (FST) Panoramica del titolo

FAST Acquisition Corp. does not have significant operations. Maggiori dettagli

FST analisi fondamentale
Punteggio fiocco di neve
Valutazione2/6
Crescita futura0/6
Prestazioni passate3/6
Salute finanziaria0/6
Dividendi0/6

FST Community Fair Values

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Concorrenti di FAST Acquisition Corp.

Storia dei prezzi e prestazioni

Riepilogo dei massimi, dei minimi e delle variazioni dei prezzi delle azioni per FAST Acquisition
Prezzi storici delle azioni
Prezzo attuale dell'azioneUS$10.18
Massimo di 52 settimaneUS$13.17
Minimo di 52 settimaneUS$10.01
Beta0
Variazione di 1 mese-0.78%
Variazione a 3 mesi0.99%
Variazione di 1 anno-17.90%
Variazione a 3 annin/a
Variazione a 5 annin/a
Variazione dall'IPO4.95%

Notizie e aggiornamenti recenti

Seeking Alpha Aug 23

Where Might Value Be Hidden?

What’s working? What rhymes? A few successes that point the way. Hiding places Before I research a company’s fundamental valuation or event path, I first focus on the potential for mispricing. There are a lot of companies out there, and I like to search good hiding places. Here’s where I’ve been looking in recent months, what I’ve been finding, and what might come next. Companies that botched their sale process What worked… Zendesk (ZEN) has a comically inept board and management that managed to completely flub their sales process. Only after they gave up did a buyer swoop back in with a mercy killing. The broken process ultimately created a great opportunity for investors’ new capital. The deal should close on its original terms by December. What’s next… Kohl’s (KSS) board and management might possibly be even worse. They are bad at running their business and bad at selling their business. They also messed up the sale process resulting in no deal and a collapsed stock price. But this could be an opportunity. They wildly exaggerated their earnings expectations in order to stave off a proxy challenge. Shareholders won’t fall for their “exaggerations” (shorter and possibly more accurate word also available) again. So they have less than a year no matter what. And they have zero remaining credibility. With stabilizing equity and credit markets, they might want to circle back to bidders. The last one standing was Franchise Group (FRG) with a bid of over $50 per share. Overly audacious asks from sellers What worked… Nielsen (NLSN) had a wide deal spread because of a wildly bullish shareholder, Windacre, whose view of the company was and is that it's worth far more than any potential bidder was willing to pay (which in turn was far higher than where it would trade as a standalone company). They have a blocking stake which imperiled a sale. However, they were able to reach an accommodation wherein this one holder will get options that will pay off if their bullishness proves to be correct. What’s next… Turquoise Hill Resources (TRQ) had a bid from Rio Tinto (RIO) for the shares that Rio doesn’t already own, but the target’s special committee turned them down cold. This will be a very hard position to maintain, especially since they will have to face up to a dilutive capital raise if they stay a standalone company. Yes, they want more as do some prominent holders. But their want is far above the (only) bidder’s bid which in turn is far above the standalone price that the market assigns TRQ shares. That leaves today’s shares beneath the private market bid and ask, which should be a solvable problem, even with audacious asks from sellers. Perhaps they take a page from NLSN and take the best available deal, even if they want more. Post-close litigation kickers What worked… Apollo (APO) successfully completed their LBO of The Fresh Market (formerly TFM) for $28.50 per share in cash in April 2016. Former TFM shareholders just received an additional $0.55 per share settlement from post-deal litigation.
Seeking Alpha Dec 09

Fast Acquisition: Too Much Uncertainty

Redemption deadline and shareholder meeting delayed. Deal still in doubt, likely litigation or reworked deal. Selling shares on uncertainty. Closing put trades. Chantham Asset Management is loading up on warrants. Uncertainty and likely dilution if a deal gets done makes shares a sell.
Seeking Alpha Dec 02

FAST Acquisition Suddenly A Low Risk, Big Upside Speculation

Wow, what a world day makes, apparently Tilman Fertitta thinks the FAST deal is so good he wants it all to himself or there's something else going on. Apparently, the drift down in stock price was more than the market, "somebody always knows." Fertitta Entertainment tried to initiate a termination of the merger of the companies involved. FAST Acquisition responded that the merger could not be terminated. This suddenly becomes a very low risk, high return speculation with $10 beneath the shares in trust.

Recent updates

Seeking Alpha Aug 23

Where Might Value Be Hidden?

What’s working? What rhymes? A few successes that point the way. Hiding places Before I research a company’s fundamental valuation or event path, I first focus on the potential for mispricing. There are a lot of companies out there, and I like to search good hiding places. Here’s where I’ve been looking in recent months, what I’ve been finding, and what might come next. Companies that botched their sale process What worked… Zendesk (ZEN) has a comically inept board and management that managed to completely flub their sales process. Only after they gave up did a buyer swoop back in with a mercy killing. The broken process ultimately created a great opportunity for investors’ new capital. The deal should close on its original terms by December. What’s next… Kohl’s (KSS) board and management might possibly be even worse. They are bad at running their business and bad at selling their business. They also messed up the sale process resulting in no deal and a collapsed stock price. But this could be an opportunity. They wildly exaggerated their earnings expectations in order to stave off a proxy challenge. Shareholders won’t fall for their “exaggerations” (shorter and possibly more accurate word also available) again. So they have less than a year no matter what. And they have zero remaining credibility. With stabilizing equity and credit markets, they might want to circle back to bidders. The last one standing was Franchise Group (FRG) with a bid of over $50 per share. Overly audacious asks from sellers What worked… Nielsen (NLSN) had a wide deal spread because of a wildly bullish shareholder, Windacre, whose view of the company was and is that it's worth far more than any potential bidder was willing to pay (which in turn was far higher than where it would trade as a standalone company). They have a blocking stake which imperiled a sale. However, they were able to reach an accommodation wherein this one holder will get options that will pay off if their bullishness proves to be correct. What’s next… Turquoise Hill Resources (TRQ) had a bid from Rio Tinto (RIO) for the shares that Rio doesn’t already own, but the target’s special committee turned them down cold. This will be a very hard position to maintain, especially since they will have to face up to a dilutive capital raise if they stay a standalone company. Yes, they want more as do some prominent holders. But their want is far above the (only) bidder’s bid which in turn is far above the standalone price that the market assigns TRQ shares. That leaves today’s shares beneath the private market bid and ask, which should be a solvable problem, even with audacious asks from sellers. Perhaps they take a page from NLSN and take the best available deal, even if they want more. Post-close litigation kickers What worked… Apollo (APO) successfully completed their LBO of The Fresh Market (formerly TFM) for $28.50 per share in cash in April 2016. Former TFM shareholders just received an additional $0.55 per share settlement from post-deal litigation.
Seeking Alpha Dec 09

Fast Acquisition: Too Much Uncertainty

Redemption deadline and shareholder meeting delayed. Deal still in doubt, likely litigation or reworked deal. Selling shares on uncertainty. Closing put trades. Chantham Asset Management is loading up on warrants. Uncertainty and likely dilution if a deal gets done makes shares a sell.
Seeking Alpha Dec 02

FAST Acquisition Suddenly A Low Risk, Big Upside Speculation

Wow, what a world day makes, apparently Tilman Fertitta thinks the FAST deal is so good he wants it all to himself or there's something else going on. Apparently, the drift down in stock price was more than the market, "somebody always knows." Fertitta Entertainment tried to initiate a termination of the merger of the companies involved. FAST Acquisition responded that the merger could not be terminated. This suddenly becomes a very low risk, high return speculation with $10 beneath the shares in trust.

Rendimenti per gli azionisti

FSTUS Capital MarketsUS Mercato
7D-1.2%0.7%-4.1%
1Y-17.9%7.6%20.6%

Ritorno vs Industria: FST ha superato il US Capital Markets che ha restituito 7.6 % nell'ultimo anno.

Rendimento vs Mercato: FST ha avuto una performance inferiore al mercato US che ha registrato un rendimento 20.6 % nell'ultimo anno.

Volatilità dei prezzi

Is FST's price volatile compared to industry and market?
FST volatility
FST Average Weekly Movement0.9%
Capital Markets Industry Average Movement3.6%
Market Average Movement7.2%
10% most volatile stocks in US Market16.6%
10% least volatile stocks in US Market3.1%

Prezzo delle azioni stabile: FST non ha avuto una volatilità dei prezzi significativa negli ultimi 3 mesi rispetto al mercato US.

Volatilità nel tempo: La volatilità settimanale ( 1% ) di FST è rimasta stabile nell'ultimo anno.

Informazioni sull'azienda

FondatoI dipendentiAMMINISTRATORE DELEGATOSito web
2020n/aSandy Beallwww.fastacq.com

FAST Acquisition Corp. Riepilogo dei fondamenti

Come si confrontano gli utili e i ricavi di FAST Acquisition con la sua capitalizzazione di mercato?
FST statistiche fondamentali
Capitalizzazione di mercatoUS$254.50m
Utili (TTM)US$40.35m
Ricavi(TTM)n/a
6.3x
Rapporto P/E
0.0x
Rapporto P/S

Utili e ricavi

Statistiche chiave sulla redditività dall'ultima relazione sugli utili (TTM)
FST Conto economico (TTM)
RicaviUS$0
Costo del fatturatoUS$0
Profitto lordoUS$0
Altre spese-US$40.35m
UtiliUS$40.35m

Ultimi utili riportati

Jun 30, 2022

Prossima data di guadagno

n/a

Utile per azione (EPS)1.61
Margine lordo0.00%
Margine di profitto netto0.00%
Rapporto debito/patrimonio netto-7.4%

Come si è comportato FST nel lungo periodo?

Vedi performance storica e confronto

Analisi aziendale e situazione dei dati finanziari

DatiUltimo aggiornamento (ora UTC)
Analisi dell'azienda2022/08/27 09:03
Prezzo dell'azione a fine giornata2022/08/25 00:00
Utili2022/06/30
Utili annuali2021/12/31

Fonti dei dati

I dati utilizzati nella nostra analisi aziendale provengono da S&P Global Market Intelligence LLC. I seguenti dati sono utilizzati nel nostro modello di analisi per generare questo report. I dati sono normalizzati, il che può comportare un ritardo nella disponibilità della fonte.

PacchettoDatiTempisticaEsempio Fonte USA *
Dati finanziari della società10 anni
  • Conto economico
  • Rendiconto finanziario
  • Bilancio
Stime di consenso degli analisti+3 anni
  • Previsioni finanziarie
  • Obiettivi di prezzo degli analisti
Prezzi di mercato30 anni
  • Prezzi delle azioni
  • Dividendi, scissioni e azioni
Proprietà10 anni
  • Top azionisti
  • Insider trading
Gestione10 anni
  • Team di leadership
  • Consiglio di amministrazione
Sviluppi principali10 anni
  • Annunci aziendali

* Esempio per i titoli statunitensi, per i titoli non statunitensi si utilizzano forme e fonti normative equivalenti.

Se non specificato, tutti i dati finanziari si basano su un periodo annuale ma vengono aggiornati trimestralmente. Si tratta dei cosiddetti dati TTM (Trailing Twelve Month) o LTM (Last Twelve Month). Per saperne di più.

Modello di analisi e Snowflake

I dettagli del modello di analisi utilizzato per generare questo report sono disponibili sulla nostra pagina Github; abbiamo anche guide su come utilizzare i nostri report e tutorial su Youtube.

Scoprite il team di livello mondiale che ha progettato e realizzato il modello di analisi Simply Wall St.

Metriche di settore e industriali

Le nostre metriche di settore e di sezione sono calcolate ogni 6 ore da Simply Wall St; i dettagli del nostro processo sono disponibili su Github.

Fonti analitiche

FAST Acquisition Corp. è coperta da 0 analisti. di questi analisti ha fornito le stime di fatturato o di utile utilizzate come input per il nostro report. Le stime degli analisti vengono aggiornate nel corso della giornata.