Loading...
FST logo

FAST Acquisition Corp.NYSE:FST Rapport sur les actions

Capitalisation boursière US$254.5m
Prix de l'action
n/a
1Y-17.9%
7D-1.2%
1D0.3%
Valeur du portefeuille
Voir

FAST Acquisition Corp.

NYSE:FST Rapport sur les actions

Capitalisation boursière : US$254.5m

This company listing is no longer active

This company may still be operating, however this listing is no longer active. Find out why through their latest events.

FST Community Fair Values

Create Narrative

See what others think this stock is worth. Follow their fair value or set your own to get alerts.

NEW493,723 members

Join community and earn perks

Gain real feedbackFrom our editorial team, personally. Not silence.
Grow your followingReal investors. The kind who actually invest, not scroll past.
Unlock free accessFree premium subscription for consistent and quality authors.
BL
BlackGoat
IN
Investingwilly
RO
RockeTeller
AG
Agricola
493,723 investors already sharing narratives

FAST Acquisition Corp. Concurrents

Historique des prix et performances

Résumé des hausses, des baisses et des variations du cours de l'action pour la période du 1er janvier au 31 décembre 2009 FAST Acquisition
Historique des cours de bourse
Prix actuel de l'actionUS$10.18
Plus haut sur 52 semainesUS$13.17
Plus bas sur 52 semainesUS$10.01
Bêta0
Variation sur 1 mois-0.78%
Variation sur 3 mois0.99%
Variation sur 1 an-17.90%
Variation sur 3 ansn/a
Variation sur 5 ansn/a
Évolution depuis l'introduction en bourse4.95%

Nouvelles et mises à jour récentes

Seeking Alpha Aug 23

Where Might Value Be Hidden?

What’s working? What rhymes? A few successes that point the way. Hiding places Before I research a company’s fundamental valuation or event path, I first focus on the potential for mispricing. There are a lot of companies out there, and I like to search good hiding places. Here’s where I’ve been looking in recent months, what I’ve been finding, and what might come next. Companies that botched their sale process What worked… Zendesk (ZEN) has a comically inept board and management that managed to completely flub their sales process. Only after they gave up did a buyer swoop back in with a mercy killing. The broken process ultimately created a great opportunity for investors’ new capital. The deal should close on its original terms by December. What’s next… Kohl’s (KSS) board and management might possibly be even worse. They are bad at running their business and bad at selling their business. They also messed up the sale process resulting in no deal and a collapsed stock price. But this could be an opportunity. They wildly exaggerated their earnings expectations in order to stave off a proxy challenge. Shareholders won’t fall for their “exaggerations” (shorter and possibly more accurate word also available) again. So they have less than a year no matter what. And they have zero remaining credibility. With stabilizing equity and credit markets, they might want to circle back to bidders. The last one standing was Franchise Group (FRG) with a bid of over $50 per share. Overly audacious asks from sellers What worked… Nielsen (NLSN) had a wide deal spread because of a wildly bullish shareholder, Windacre, whose view of the company was and is that it's worth far more than any potential bidder was willing to pay (which in turn was far higher than where it would trade as a standalone company). They have a blocking stake which imperiled a sale. However, they were able to reach an accommodation wherein this one holder will get options that will pay off if their bullishness proves to be correct. What’s next… Turquoise Hill Resources (TRQ) had a bid from Rio Tinto (RIO) for the shares that Rio doesn’t already own, but the target’s special committee turned them down cold. This will be a very hard position to maintain, especially since they will have to face up to a dilutive capital raise if they stay a standalone company. Yes, they want more as do some prominent holders. But their want is far above the (only) bidder’s bid which in turn is far above the standalone price that the market assigns TRQ shares. That leaves today’s shares beneath the private market bid and ask, which should be a solvable problem, even with audacious asks from sellers. Perhaps they take a page from NLSN and take the best available deal, even if they want more. Post-close litigation kickers What worked… Apollo (APO) successfully completed their LBO of The Fresh Market (formerly TFM) for $28.50 per share in cash in April 2016. Former TFM shareholders just received an additional $0.55 per share settlement from post-deal litigation.
Seeking Alpha Dec 09

Fast Acquisition: Too Much Uncertainty

Redemption deadline and shareholder meeting delayed. Deal still in doubt, likely litigation or reworked deal. Selling shares on uncertainty. Closing put trades. Chantham Asset Management is loading up on warrants. Uncertainty and likely dilution if a deal gets done makes shares a sell.
Seeking Alpha Dec 02

FAST Acquisition Suddenly A Low Risk, Big Upside Speculation

Wow, what a world day makes, apparently Tilman Fertitta thinks the FAST deal is so good he wants it all to himself or there's something else going on. Apparently, the drift down in stock price was more than the market, "somebody always knows." Fertitta Entertainment tried to initiate a termination of the merger of the companies involved. FAST Acquisition responded that the merger could not be terminated. This suddenly becomes a very low risk, high return speculation with $10 beneath the shares in trust.

Recent updates

Seeking Alpha Aug 23

Where Might Value Be Hidden?

What’s working? What rhymes? A few successes that point the way. Hiding places Before I research a company’s fundamental valuation or event path, I first focus on the potential for mispricing. There are a lot of companies out there, and I like to search good hiding places. Here’s where I’ve been looking in recent months, what I’ve been finding, and what might come next. Companies that botched their sale process What worked… Zendesk (ZEN) has a comically inept board and management that managed to completely flub their sales process. Only after they gave up did a buyer swoop back in with a mercy killing. The broken process ultimately created a great opportunity for investors’ new capital. The deal should close on its original terms by December. What’s next… Kohl’s (KSS) board and management might possibly be even worse. They are bad at running their business and bad at selling their business. They also messed up the sale process resulting in no deal and a collapsed stock price. But this could be an opportunity. They wildly exaggerated their earnings expectations in order to stave off a proxy challenge. Shareholders won’t fall for their “exaggerations” (shorter and possibly more accurate word also available) again. So they have less than a year no matter what. And they have zero remaining credibility. With stabilizing equity and credit markets, they might want to circle back to bidders. The last one standing was Franchise Group (FRG) with a bid of over $50 per share. Overly audacious asks from sellers What worked… Nielsen (NLSN) had a wide deal spread because of a wildly bullish shareholder, Windacre, whose view of the company was and is that it's worth far more than any potential bidder was willing to pay (which in turn was far higher than where it would trade as a standalone company). They have a blocking stake which imperiled a sale. However, they were able to reach an accommodation wherein this one holder will get options that will pay off if their bullishness proves to be correct. What’s next… Turquoise Hill Resources (TRQ) had a bid from Rio Tinto (RIO) for the shares that Rio doesn’t already own, but the target’s special committee turned them down cold. This will be a very hard position to maintain, especially since they will have to face up to a dilutive capital raise if they stay a standalone company. Yes, they want more as do some prominent holders. But their want is far above the (only) bidder’s bid which in turn is far above the standalone price that the market assigns TRQ shares. That leaves today’s shares beneath the private market bid and ask, which should be a solvable problem, even with audacious asks from sellers. Perhaps they take a page from NLSN and take the best available deal, even if they want more. Post-close litigation kickers What worked… Apollo (APO) successfully completed their LBO of The Fresh Market (formerly TFM) for $28.50 per share in cash in April 2016. Former TFM shareholders just received an additional $0.55 per share settlement from post-deal litigation.
Seeking Alpha Dec 09

Fast Acquisition: Too Much Uncertainty

Redemption deadline and shareholder meeting delayed. Deal still in doubt, likely litigation or reworked deal. Selling shares on uncertainty. Closing put trades. Chantham Asset Management is loading up on warrants. Uncertainty and likely dilution if a deal gets done makes shares a sell.
Seeking Alpha Dec 02

FAST Acquisition Suddenly A Low Risk, Big Upside Speculation

Wow, what a world day makes, apparently Tilman Fertitta thinks the FAST deal is so good he wants it all to himself or there's something else going on. Apparently, the drift down in stock price was more than the market, "somebody always knows." Fertitta Entertainment tried to initiate a termination of the merger of the companies involved. FAST Acquisition responded that the merger could not be terminated. This suddenly becomes a very low risk, high return speculation with $10 beneath the shares in trust.

Rendement pour les actionnaires

FSTUS Capital MarketsUS Marché
7D-1.2%-0.002%-1.4%
1Y-17.9%1.6%17.1%

Rendement vs Industrie: FST a dépassé le secteur US Capital Markets qui a rapporté 1.6 % au cours de l'année écoulée.

Rendement vs marché: FST a sous-performé le marché US qui a rapporté 17.1 % au cours de l'année écoulée.

Volatilité des prix

Is FST's price volatile compared to industry and market?
FST volatility
FST Average Weekly Movement0.9%
Capital Markets Industry Average Movement3.8%
Market Average Movement7.2%
10% most volatile stocks in US Market16.4%
10% least volatile stocks in US Market3.2%

Cours de l'action stable: FST n'a pas connu de volatilité de prix significative au cours des 3 derniers mois par rapport au marché US.

Volatilité au fil du temps: La volatilité hebdomadaire de FST ( 1% ) est restée stable au cours de l'année écoulée.

À propos de l'entreprise

FondéeSalariésPDGSite web
2020n/aSandy Beallwww.fastacq.com

FAST Acquisition Corp. Résumé des fondamentaux

Comment les bénéfices et les revenus de FAST Acquisition se comparent-ils à sa capitalisation boursière ?
FST statistiques fondamentales
Capitalisation boursièreUS$254.50m
Bénéfices(TTM)US$40.35m
Recettes(TTM)n/a
6.3x
Ratio P/E
0.0x
Ratio P/S

Le site FST est-il surévalué ?

Voir Juste valeur et analyse de l'évaluation

Bénéfices et recettes

Principales statistiques de rentabilité tirées du dernier rapport sur les bénéfices (TTM)
FST compte de résultat (TTM)
RecettesUS$0
Coût des recettesUS$0
Marge bruteUS$0
Autres dépenses-US$40.35m
Les revenusUS$40.35m

Derniers bénéfices déclarés

Jun 30, 2022

Prochaine date de publication des résultats

s/o

Résultat par action (EPS)1.61
Marge brute0.00%
Marge bénéficiaire nette0.00%
Ratio dettes/capitaux propres-7.4%

Quelles ont été les performances à long terme de FST?

Voir les performances historiques et les comparaisons

Analyse de l'entreprise et données financières

DonnéesDernière mise à jour (heure UTC)
Analyse de l'entreprise2022/08/27 20:45
Cours de l'action en fin de journée2022/08/25 00:00
Les revenus2022/06/30
Revenus annuels2021/12/31

Sources de données

Les données utilisées dans notre analyse de l'entreprise proviennent de S&P Global Market Intelligence LLC. Les données suivantes sont utilisées dans notre modèle d'analyse pour générer ce rapport. Les données sont normalisées, ce qui peut entraîner un délai avant que la source ne soit disponible.

PaquetDonnéesCadre temporelExemple de source américaine *
Finances de l'entreprise10 ans
  • Compte de résultat
  • Tableau des flux de trésorerie
  • Bilan
Estimations consensuelles des analystes+3 ans
  • Prévisions financières
  • Objectifs de prix des analystes
Prix du marché30 ans
  • Cours des actions
  • Dividendes, scissions et actions
Propriété10 ans
  • Actionnaires principaux
  • Délits d'initiés
Gestion10 ans
  • L'équipe dirigeante
  • Conseil d'administration
Principaux développements10 ans
  • Annonces de l'entreprise

* Exemple pour les titres américains ; pour les titres non américains, des formulaires réglementaires et des sources équivalentes sont utilisés.

Sauf indication contraire, toutes les données financières sont basées sur une période annuelle mais mises à jour trimestriellement. C'est ce qu'on appelle les données des douze derniers mois (TTM) ou des douze derniers mois (LTM). En savoir plus.

Modèle d'analyse et flocon de neige

Les détails du modèle d’analyse utilisé pour générer ce rapport sont disponibles sur notre page Github ; nous proposons également des guides sur la façon d’utiliser nos rapports et des tutoriels sur YouTube.

Découvrez l'équipe de classe mondiale qui a conçu et construit le modèle d'analyse Simply Wall St.

Indicateurs de l'industrie et du secteur

Nos indicateurs de secteur et de section sont calculés toutes les 6 heures par Simply Wall St. Les détails de notre processus sont disponibles sur Github.

Sources des analystes

FAST Acquisition Corp. est couverte par 0 analystes. de ces analystes ont soumis les estimations de revenus ou de bénéfices utilisées comme données d'entrée dans notre rapport. Les soumissions des analystes sont mises à jour tout au long de la journée.