exit-earnings model with explicit share-count reduction (the standard revenue/margin/PE approach understates PayPal because it ignores the buyback, which is central to this thesis) – updated with Q2 2026 actuals – 1. Revenue FY2030: ~$37.5B (FY26 tracking toward ~$34.5B → implies only ~2% CAGR – target kept from the original model, now extra-conservative: stabilization only, no reacceleration) 2. Net margin: 15.5% → net income ~$5.8-6.0B (~13.8% today; $1.5B cost program on track, transaction-margin guidance raised in Q2 – path intact) 3. Share count FY2030: ~680-700M (from 862M today) Assumes ~5.5% net annual share reduction – deliberately BELOW the actual ~6.3%/yr pace (920M → 862M in twelve months, ~$6B repurchased). Feasibility check: retiring ~170-180M shares over ~4 years costs roughly $3B/yr even at rising prices, well within $6B+ annual free cash flow (adj. FCF >$1.8B in Q2 alone). 4. EPS FY2030: $5.8-6.0B / ~690M ≈ $8.40-8.75 5. Exit multiple: 12x earnings → ~$101-105 per share in FY2030 (low end of a normal profitable-financial multiple; no premium, zero value assigned to agentic commerce optionality, zero value assigned to the pending bank charter) 6. Discount back ~4.0 years at 10% p.a. → fair value today ≈ $68 Every input is conservative on purpose. The move from $65 is mechanics, not momentum: a shorter discount horizon, a share count already below the model's glide path, and operating inputs confirmed at or above the conservative case. Notably, the $60.50 bid on the table now sits below even this deliberately conservative math. Kill-switch: if Branded Checkout growth turns negative again, the network is eroding and the thesis is void regardless of this math. Sensitivity: at a 16x exit multiple and the actual ~6.3%/yr buyback pace, the same framework yields ~$95-100. I deliberately anchor on the conservative case.