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CoreCard 과거 순이익 실적
과거 기준 점검 4/6
CoreCard의 수입은 연평균 -16.5%의 비율로 감소해 온 반면, Software 산업은 수입이 연평균 24.9% 증가했습니다. 매출은 연평균 8.9%의 비율로 증가해 왔습니다. CoreCard의 자기자본이익률은 14.2%이고 순이익률은 12.4%입니다.
핵심 정보
-16.49%
순이익 성장률
-14.31%
주당순이익(EPS) 성장률
| Software 산업 성장률 | 17.33% |
| 매출 성장률 | 8.89% |
| 자기자본이익률 | 14.23% |
| 순이익률 | 12.36% |
| 최근 순이익 업데이트 | 30 Jun 2025 |
최근 과거 실적 업데이트
Recent updates
분석 기사 • May 30
What CoreCard Corporation's (NYSE:CCRD) 32% Share Price Gain Is Not Telling You
CoreCard Corporation ( NYSE:CCRD ) shareholders have had their patience rewarded with a 32% share price jump in the...분석 기사 • May 08
Here's What's Concerning About CoreCard's (NYSE:CCRD) Returns On Capital
Did you know there are some financial metrics that can provide clues of a potential multi-bagger? One common approach...분석 기사 • Mar 31
Market Participants Recognise CoreCard Corporation's (NYSE:CCRD) Earnings
When close to half the companies in the United States have price-to-earnings ratios (or "P/E's") below 17x, you may...분석 기사 • Nov 09
CoreCard Corporation's (NYSE:CCRD) 30% Jump Shows Its Popularity With Investors
CoreCard Corporation ( NYSE:CCRD ) shares have continued their recent momentum with a 30% gain in the last month alone...분석 기사 • Nov 07
New Forecasts: Here's What Analysts Think The Future Holds For CoreCard Corporation (NYSE:CCRD)
CoreCard Corporation ( NYSE:CCRD ) shareholders will have a reason to smile today, with the covering analyst making...분석 기사 • Oct 28
CoreCard's (NYSE:CCRD) Returns On Capital Not Reflecting Well On The Business
If we want to find a stock that could multiply over the long term, what are the underlying trends we should look for...Seeking Alpha • Oct 25
CoreCard Corp: Confidently Befitting A 'Five Year Double'
Summary CoreCard Corp's (CCRD) partnership with Goldman Sachs for Apple Card processing continues until 2029, despite Goldman's consumer credit retreat. Market undervalues CCRD's extended cash flow from Goldman, reflecting inefficiency in recognizing the company's true worth. CCRD's strong financial health, including no debt and ongoing stock buybacks, positions it well despite potential revenue shifts. Future growth prospects remain robust, with non-Goldman revenue nearing $25M and potential for high-margin expansion and new client enrollments. Read the full article on Seeking Alpha
새로운 내러티브 • Sep 28
Diversifying Beyond Goldman Sachs To Fuel Growth Through Corfinity And Calculated Deals
Diversification of revenue streams through expanded customer base and investment in Corfinity platform indicates potential for stable growth and higher margins.Seeking Alpha • Sep 17
Rebooting CoreCard
Summary CoreCard's future is uncertain due to Goldman Sachs ending its Apple Card partnership, which significantly impacts CoreCard's revenue and growth prospects. Despite losing major clients, CoreCard's technology remains robust, and it is actively seeking new strategic customers to mitigate revenue decline. The company remains profitable, generates cash, and is reducing its share count, but faces challenges with declining revenue and potential loss of the GM card business. Analysts project earnings growth and some revenue increase by 2025, but the transition period and client uncertainties pose significant risks. Read the full article on Seeking AlphaSeeking Alpha • May 30
CoreCard Corporation: Poor Execution And Uncertainty Over The Turnaround
Summary Although CoreCard has solid technology—which is further supported by the clients they serve—my primary worries are with the poor execution of the management and the uncertainty around the turnaround. Because of its reliance on Goldman Sachs, CoreCard has experienced revenue concentration risk, which has resulted in diminishing revenue and profitability. Apart from the above reasons, I am uncomfortable with the 21x EV/EBIT multiple that the company is currently trading at. I rate the company as a hold. Read the full article on Seeking AlphaSeeking Alpha • Nov 28
CoreCard's Goldman Cutbacks Drag On Growth While Expenses Remain High (Downgrade)
Summary CoreCard Corporation reported Q3 2023 financial results below consensus revenue estimates. The company provides payment processing services to businesses and consumers globally. My outlook for CoreCard is pessimistic due to a lack of strong growth from its Goldman relationship and a potential economic downturn ahead. Read the full article on Seeking Alpha분석 기사 • Nov 06
This Analyst Just Downgraded Their CoreCard Corporation (NYSE:CCRD) EPS Forecasts
The analyst covering CoreCard Corporation ( NYSE:CCRD ) delivered a dose of negativity to shareholders today, by making...분석 기사 • Sep 14
CoreCard's (NYSE:CCRD) Returns On Capital Are Heading Higher
Did you know there are some financial metrics that can provide clues of a potential multi-bagger? Firstly, we'll want...Seeking Alpha • Sep 08
CoreCard: A Deep Dive Into Client Risk, Scalability, And Financials
Summary CoreCard relies heavily on Goldman Sachs for revenue, posing a concentration risk. The revised agreement with Goldman Sachs provides a more stable revenue framework but introduces new risks. CoreCard's business model is scalable, but success depends on effective hiring and talent management, especially in international locations. Read the full article on Seeking AlphaSeeking Alpha • Jun 21
CoreCard: Building A Moat In Program Management And Processing Software
Summary CoreCard Corp. is a leading provider of program management and processing software for financial products, with a strong competitive moat built on high-quality offerings and strategic relationships with industry leaders like Apple Card and Goldman Sachs. Despite concerns about customer concentration, the company's ongoing relationship with Goldman Sachs and the complexity of its software create significant barriers to entry for competitors and strengthen its market position. CCRD's financial performance and growth potential justify a higher valuation than its current multiple, with potential for further re-rating as it executes its expansion strategy and secures new customers. Read the full article on Seeking AlphaSeeking Alpha • Feb 15
CoreCard Q4 2022 Earnings Preview
CoreCard (NYSE:CCRD) is scheduled to announce Q4 earnings results on Thursday, February 16th, before market open. The consensus EPS Estimate is $0.21 (-30.0% Y/Y) and the consensus Revenue Estimate is $15.2M (+16.5% Y/Y). Over the last 1 year, CCRD has beaten EPS estimates 75% of the time and has beaten revenue estimates 75% of the time. Over the last 3 months, EPS estimates have seen 0 upward revisions and 1 downward.Seeking Alpha • Jan 31
CoreCard: Investing For The Future
Summary CoreCard has made investments to boost growth in the coming years. The company is currently undervalued by approximately 10%. There are some risks to take into account, such as the reliance on Goldman Sachs. At the end of 2021, I wrote an article on CoreCard (CCRD) in which I stated that the company is undervalued and that the company is poised for long-term growth. Since then the stock price (as well as the major indices) has fallen significantly. Recently, I did another deep dive into the company and what I read made me even more confident in the company's growth prospects. In this article, I will explain why I think that the company has positioned itself well for the coming years. The company For people that are unfamiliar with the company, CoreCard is an issuer-processor in the payment network space. An issuer-processor manages card issuance, systems of record, authorize transactions among other things. There are many legacy companies that focus on these tasks but CoreCard's software allows for more customization and is able to process more complicated accounts, for example, it is able to combine multiple loans on one statement, while it is also able to process transactions in various currencies. Key players fintech industry (CoreCard investor presentation) The company sells its solutions in two ways. The first is to get a license and pay for managed services, implementation fees, license tiers (based on the number of accounts), professional services (including customization and operational support), maintenance, and license support. The second option is to become a processing customer. If a customer becomes a processing customer, CoreCard will do the processing for transactions and customers pay for implementation, processing, other services (such as monthly statements), and professional services. Currently, the majority of the company's revenue comes from license customers as the largest program, the Goldman Sachs (GS) Apple (AAPL) credit card, is a license customer. What is refreshing about CoreCard in comparison to other growth stocks is that the company is actually cash flow and EPS positive. The company uses the free cash flow to invest in its business and as I will elaborate on later, hire a substantial amount of new employees. The company needs the majority of these new employees to attract new large programs such as the aforementioned Apple Credit Card. As a result of prudent management and the ability to use its free cash flow for investments the company's debt levels are low with a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of -1.8 at the end of Q3 and a debt-to-equity ratio of 7.3%. CCRD Net debt-to-EBITDA (Tikr.com) Another thing that I like about the company is its management team. Leland Strange the CEO of the company has been with the company since 1985, although truth be told the company was focusing on different markets at the time and only made CoreCard the primary business in 2015. Nevertheless, Mr. Strange runs the company responsibly, as the company focuses on delivering a quality service to its shareholders and sometimes has to deny new clients in order to not jeopardize its operation. Additionally, his interests are aligned with shareholders as he owns a significant amount of the outstanding shares (approximately 18%). What has the company been doing over the past year(s)? If you listen to the CoreCard earning calls you hear CEO Leland Strange mention that the company needs to invest significant amounts of capital in order to attract a new large client. He also mentions that they will not take on large clients if they feel that they are not ready, or in other words, they will not add a new large client if they cannot deliver the quality that they are aiming for. For this reason, the company hasn't taken in new large clients but invested a significant amount of money for a company that is the size of CoreCard. They used most of the money to buy new equipment and hire additional employees in their offices abroad located in India, Romania, Colombia, and Dubai. Unfortunately, most of these employees are currently not generating revenue but are merely learning the process from more experienced employees. The company expects that they will be able to add one or two new large programs by fall next year as mentioned in their Q3 earnings call: What about larger opportunities? We fully expect by this time next fall to have either announced or be working on 1 or 2 large programs. They'll either be direct CoreCard, or through current partners such as Goldman, or through new ones currently in discussion stages, brought to us by other current program managers. Headcount CCRD (10Q 2022 Q3, 10K 2021, 10K 2020) Another thing that the company worked on was the American Express (AXP) certification process, which it completed in October of 2022. Later that month the company launched the Simon (SPG) Amex credit card. This gives the company a direct link with the AMEX network and gives it the possibility to also work together on future projects with American Express. While we're on the topic of AMEX, the company was also able to finalize a contract with AMEX to process AMEX Kabbage loans. AMEX Kabbage focuses on providing working capital to (small) businesses. At the Goldman Sachs U.S. Financial Services Conference AMEX mentioned that small business formations were up 23%, which increases the TAM of Kabbage. If AMEX is successful with Kabbage, this will increase the revenues of CoreCard going forward. Valuation Before investing in a stock, it is important to have a general idea about its valuation. Although a company's valuation shouldn't be the only reason that investors invest in a company, valuation can serve as a guideline for when to invest in or divest shares of the company. I prefer to use multiple methods which include a DCF model based on a perpetual growth rate and an exit multiple, as well as a multiples analysis. Discounted cash flows When I make a DCF I like to use multiple scenarios. I use scenarios because making a DCF requires a lot of assumptions. By using scenarios, you can see how the inputs would affect the share price. I use revenue growth as estimated by analysts (data from TIKR) and COGS based on the COGS over the past three years, slightly adjusted based on my expectations. For CoreCard this leads to the following assumptions: DCF inputs (Author) To get the present value, we need to discount the future cash flows to today. To do this, I like to use the weighted average cost of capital ((WACC)) method, which is based on the company's beta, my minimum required rate of return, a risk-free rate (in this case the treasury rates), the company's cost of equity (based on the CAPM), and cost of debt (based on interest payments and value of debt). This leads to the following WACC estimation for CoreCard: WACC estimate (Author) For the perpetuity growth method, I use a perpetual growth rate of 3%. The reason for this is that a company cannot grow faster than GDP in the long run, and over the past decade, the GDP growth rate has averaged 3%. This assumption is important as the majority of the valuation is calculated past the 5-year estimation window. This leads to a target price of $37.17. For the exit multiple, I like to use the average EV/EBITDA of the company. For CoreCard, I used an exit multiple of 10, which is significantly lower than its average of 31 over the past 5 years. I think 10 is a reasonable estimate as the market has significantly changed, the cost of capital has increased and wages (an important input cost for CoreCard), have also increased substantially. This leads to a price target of $42.46. Multiples For the multiples, I like to use the price-to-earnings multiple, as well as the EV/Revenue multiple. In terms of the price-to-earnings multiple, the company's multiple has been very volatile over the past 5 years. The average since going public is 18.22, but I think that this is slightly too low based on the growth prospects of the company. Based on that, I adjusted it upwards to 30, leading to a price target of $30.90 based on 2021's earnings. If we take a look at the company's EV/Revenue, we see that the average over the past 5 years was 7.7x. I think this is slightly on the higher side given that over the past year, the average was closer to 3-4. Based on that I adjust it slightly downward to 5, leading to a price target of $34.03.Seeking Alpha • Jan 23
CoreCard: Potential Buyout
Summary Potential acquisition in the fintech space. Late last year, media reports appeared that Goldman Sachs has expressed interest in acquiring credit card issuance software provider CoreCard. Goldman Sachs, which manages Apple Card, has been CoreCard’s largest customer, accounting for over 70% of the company’s revenues. A buyout might be likely given CoreCard’s relative cheapness amid a substantial growth runway and GS’ continuing focus on card partnerships. Meanwhile, CoreCard’s CEO/founder might be a willing seller here given his large ownership stake. CoreCard (CCRD) is a $279m market cap company providing software, consulting and processing services to credit card issuers. In 2018, the company struck a deal to license its software to Goldman Sachs (GS) which manages the Apple Card. GS has been CCRD’s major customer since then, accounting for over 70% of revenues. In November ’22, WSJ reported that GS expressed interest in acquiring CCRD, among a couple of other fintech software companies. I subsequently highlighted the idea to Special Situation Investing members, noting that an acquisition might be likely. CCRD's share price has jumped 14% since, however, I think the situation is still interesting. Aside from the already existing tight cooperation between GS and CCRD, there are a number of aspects suggesting both sides might potentially come to terms on an acquisition: CCRD seems to be cheap trading at 10x EBITDA. While this is quite a sizable multiple, the company’s current EBITDA is likely significantly below the company’s true earnings power in the long-term. CCRD is a fast-growing company which has compounded its topline at 34% CAGR since 2018 driven by an increase in the number of Apple Card users from 3.3m in 2020 to 6.7m as of early 2022. An increasing growth contribution has come from CCRD’s other partnerships, including the agreement with Cardless to launch a co-branded card with American Express and another partnership to process American Express’ Kabbage loans. It seems, however, that there is substantial further growth runway ahead. CCRD’s management has projected a 20-25% growth rate going forward. This estimate seems reasonable, if not conservative, given several points: Penetration of the Apple Card is still low. For reference, largest credit card provider Chase recorded 149m holders in 2021. The Apple Card - which is currently limited to the US - likely has a TAM north of 50m individuals. The management expects to land 1-2 large customers by the end of 2023 and 3-4 by late 2024. The new customers are expected to come either through Goldman or new partnerships which are apparently already in discussion stages. The American Express partnership will give CCRD direct connection to the American Express network (in addition to Visa and Mastercard). This means that CCRD will be able to process other customers using the American Express network. Likewise, the company does not seem expensive on a relative valuation basis. CCRD currently trades at 3.7x TTM revenues. In comparison, peer Galileo Financial Technologies was acquired by SoFi in 2020 at a 6x revenue multiple. The only publicly-listed competitor Marqeta (MQ) is currently valued at 2.7x TTM revenue. Both companies seem somewhat comparable - not unlike CCRD, MQ has a high customer concentration risk, with 70% of revenues coming from Square. It is worth highlighting, however, that MQ primarily operates in the debit card issuing space as opposed to credit card issuing which is CCRD’s focus. As noted by CCRD’s founder/CEO, credit card issuing is much more sophisticated and less commoditized given tougher regulatory scrutiny and the need for a ledger to keep up with interest charges - CCRD’s CEO during the investor conference in August ’22: I think credit is probably, oh, exponentially 20 times, 30 times more difficult than credit. When you go to the issuing space, you really can talk about three things. You talk about stored value; that's a prepaid card. It can have all kinds of names. It can be a gift card. It can be all sorts of things. But it means the money's in the bank somewhere. And we're simply using a card to allocate the money that's in the bank in some way. […] The interest complexity and the regulatory make it just totally different. It is easy. It's relatively easy to build a software platform that can process stored value or that can process debit. I mean, debit is probably the simplest of all. I think the big difference that we see and the CoreCard takes advantage of is that credit is where people make money. Debit and stored value, you pay money to somebody to keep up with that credit. You've got interest being earned. So therefore, you have a source of funds to pay for the complexity of credit, as opposed to just kind of keeping up with a very simple ledger. Worth noting that MQ has recently entered into the credit card issuing space, however, as noted by CCRD’s CEO, given the complexity inherent in credit card issuance MQ might very well need a number of years to provide offerings on par with those of CCRD. Given CCRD’s highly sophisticated service offering in a market with relatively few suppliers, the business might warrant a significant premium versus the competitor MQ. Aside from MQ and Galileo, the other competitor in the space is i2c.Seeking Alpha • Nov 08
CoreCard gains on report that Goldman may have buyout interest
CoreCard (NYSE:CCRD) rose 3.1% on a report that Goldman Sachs may be interested in the payments platform. Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS) is said to be interested in a payments-technology firm and is looking at different companies, according to a WSJ report, which cited people familiar. Goldman executives have talked about acquiring a company called Deserve that the bank already has ties with, the WSJ said. The bank has also looked at CoreCard (CCRD) and a credit-card platform Cardless. No talks are currently happening between GS and the companies. Developing story ...매출 및 비용 세부 내역
매출 및 비용 세부 내역
CoreCard가 돈을 벌고 사용하는 방법. 최근 발표된 LTM 실적 기준.
순이익 및 매출 추이
| 날짜 | 매출 | 순이익 | 일반관리비 | 연구개발비 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30 Jun 25 | 65 | 8 | 8 | 11 |
| 31 Mar 25 | 61 | 7 | 8 | 10 |
| 31 Dec 24 | 57 | 5 | 7 | 9 |
| 30 Sep 24 | 55 | 4 | 7 | 8 |
| 30 Jun 24 | 52 | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| 31 Mar 24 | 54 | 3 | 6 | 8 |
| 31 Dec 23 | 56 | 3 | 7 | 8 |
| 30 Sep 23 | 60 | 4 | 7 | 9 |
| 30 Jun 23 | 61 | 5 | 7 | 9 |
| 31 Mar 23 | 60 | 6 | 6 | 10 |
| 31 Dec 22 | 70 | 14 | 6 | 12 |
| 30 Sep 22 | 67 | 16 | 7 | 10 |
| 30 Jun 22 | 65 | 17 | 7 | 10 |
| 31 Mar 22 | 64 | 17 | 7 | 10 |
| 31 Dec 21 | 48 | 9 | 6 | 9 |
| 30 Sep 21 | 45 | 8 | 6 | 9 |
| 30 Jun 21 | 42 | 9 | 5 | 8 |
| 31 Mar 21 | 37 | 8 | 5 | 6 |
| 31 Dec 20 | 36 | 8 | 5 | 5 |
| 30 Sep 20 | 37 | 10 | 5 | 5 |
| 30 Jun 20 | 36 | 10 | 4 | 5 |
| 31 Mar 20 | 35 | 10 | 4 | 5 |
| 31 Dec 19 | 34 | 11 | 4 | 5 |
| 30 Sep 19 | 30 | 10 | 3 | 4 |
| 30 Jun 19 | 26 | 8 | 3 | 4 |
| 31 Mar 19 | 23 | 7 | 2 | 4 |
| 31 Dec 18 | 20 | 6 | 2 | 3 |
| 30 Sep 18 | 17 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| 30 Jun 18 | 13 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| 31 Mar 18 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| 31 Dec 17 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| 30 Sep 17 | 9 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| 30 Jun 17 | 10 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| 31 Mar 17 | 8 | -1 | 2 | 3 |
| 31 Dec 16 | 8 | -1 | 2 | 3 |
| 30 Sep 16 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| 30 Jun 16 | 6 | -1 | 2 | 3 |
| 31 Mar 16 | 5 | -1 | 2 | 3 |
| 31 Dec 15 | 5 | -1 | 2 | 3 |
| 30 Sep 15 | 5 | -2 | 2 | 3 |
| 30 Jun 15 | 4 | -2 | 2 | 3 |
| 31 Mar 15 | 4 | -1 | 1 | 3 |
| 31 Dec 14 | 4 | -1 | 1 | 3 |
양질의 수익: CCRD는 고품질 수익을 보유하고 있습니다.
이익 마진 증가: CCRD의 현재 순 이익률 (12.4%)은 지난해 (3%)보다 높습니다.
잉여현금흐름 대비 순이익 분석
과거 순이익 성장 분석
수익추이: CCRD의 수익은 지난 5년 동안 연평균 16.5% 감소했습니다.
성장 가속화: 지난 1년간 CCRD 의 수익 증가율(403.9%)은 연간 평균(-16.5%)을 초과합니다.
수익 대 산업: CCRD의 지난 1년 수익 증가율(403.9%)은 Software 업계의 14.3%를 상회했습니다.
자기자본이익률
높은 ROE: CCRD의 자본 수익률(14.2%)은 낮음으로 평가됩니다.
총자산이익률
투하자본수익률
우수한 과거 실적 기업을 찾아보세요
기업 분석 및 재무 데이터 상태
| 데이터 | 최종 업데이트 (UTC 시간) |
|---|---|
| 기업 분석 | 2025/10/30 19:30 |
| 종가 | 2025/10/30 00:00 |
| 수익 | 2025/06/30 |
| 연간 수익 | 2024/12/31 |
데이터 소스
당사의 기업 분석에 사용되는 데이터는 S&P Global Market Intelligence LLC에서 제공됩니다. 아래 데이터는 이 보고서를 생성하기 위해 분석 모델에서 사용됩니다. 데이터는 정규화되므로 소스가 제공된 후 지연이 발생할 수 있습니다.
| 패키지 | 데이터 | 기간 | 미국 소스 예시 * |
|---|---|---|---|
| 기업 재무제표 | 10년 |
| |
| 분석가 컨센서스 추정치 | +3년 |
|
|
| 시장 가격 | 30년 |
| |
| 지분 구조 | 10년 |
| |
| 경영진 | 10년 |
| |
| 주요 개발 | 10년 |
|
* 미국 증권에 대한 예시이며, 비(非)미국 증권에는 해당 국가의 규제 서식 및 자료원을 사용합니다.
별도로 명시되지 않는 한 모든 재무 데이터는 연간 기간을 기준으로 하지만 분기별로 업데이트됩니다. 이를 TTM(최근 12개월) 또는 LTM(지난 12개월) 데이터라고 합니다. 자세히 알아보기.
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산업 및 섹터 지표
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분석가 소스
CoreCard Corporation는 2명의 분석가가 다루고 있습니다. 이 중 1명의 분석가가 우리 보고서에 입력 데이터로 사용되는 매출 또는 수익 추정치를 제출했습니다. 분석가의 제출 자료는 하루 종일 업데이트됩니다.
| 분석가 | 기관 |
|---|---|
| Harold Goetsch | B. Riley Securities, Inc. |
| Anja Marie Soderstrom | Sidoti & Company, LLC |