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WeWork 향후 성장
Future 기준 점검 0/6
현재 WeWork 의 성장과 수익을 예측할 만큼 분석가의 범위가 충분하지 않습니다.
핵심 정보
n/a
이익 성장률
n/a
EPS 성장률
| Real Estate 이익 성장 | 27.1% |
| 매출 성장률 | n/a |
| 향후 자기자본이익률 | n/a |
| 애널리스트 커버리지 | None |
| 마지막 업데이트 | n/a |
최근 향후 성장 업데이트
Recent updates
Seeking Alpha • Nov 03
WeWork: When Do We Crash?
Summary WeWork may file for bankruptcy as early as next week, following a 92% crash in its stock. Bankruptcy could be a good thing for stakeholders like employees and clients, but shareholders will likely be wiped out. A new WeWork could renegotiate leases and reduce expenses, but customer retention during the bankruptcy process is uncertain. Read the full article on Seeking AlphaSeeking Alpha • Oct 06
WeWork Stock: Watch The Chaos From The Side
Summary WeWork Inc. continues to generate decent revenue figures from hybrid office demand. The company remains in a perilous state, with cash and equivalents dropping to $205 million as of the end of its last reported fiscal 2023 second quarter. Cash burn came in at $303 million for the second quarter, a dip from the first quarter but materially unsustainable against WeWork's liquidity. Huge concessions are needed from its lenders and landlords to prevent a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. Read the full article on Seeking Alpha분석 기사 • Aug 11
Little Excitement Around WeWork Inc.'s (NYSE:WE) Revenues As Shares Take 27% Pounding
To the annoyance of some shareholders, WeWork Inc. ( NYSE:WE ) shares are down a considerable 27% in the last month...Seeking Alpha • Aug 09
A 'Going Concern' Filing On August 8 For WeWork Is An Orange Flag
Summary WeWork's inclusion of a "going concern" statement in their 10-Q filing caused a sharp drop in their stock price after the close on August 8. This ASU No. 2014-15 (subtopic 205-40) "going concern" statement by management is not the same as a going concern statement by auditors in an annual report. WeWork plans to reduce costs, increase revenue, control expenses, and seek additional capital to alleviate the going concern issue. WeWork will run out of cash by early next year if they continue to burn cash at the same rate as in 2Q. Read the full article on Seeking AlphaSeeking Alpha • Jun 27
WeWork: Solvency Is Secured For Now
Summary WeWork is being priced for a near-term Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing due to its cash burn and executive turnover. A March deal with SoftBank and a group of investors will help reduce WeWork's net debt and extend its cash runway. Despite the deal, WeWork still faces challenges in reducing its cash burn and boosting its occupancy rates. Read the full article on Seeking Alpha분석 기사 • May 12
US$3.38: That's What Analysts Think WeWork Inc. (NYSE:WE) Is Worth After Its Latest Results
WeWork Inc. ( NYSE:WE ) last week reported its latest first-quarter results, which makes it a good time for investors...Seeking Alpha • Feb 15
WeWork Q4 2022 Earnings Preview
WeWork (NYSE:WE) is scheduled to announce Q4 earnings results on Thursday, February 16th, before market open. The consensus EPS Estimate is -$0.46 and the consensus Revenue Estimate is $847.34M Over the last 3 months, EPS estimates have seen 1 upward revision and 2 downward. Revenue estimates have seen 0 upward revisions and 2 downward.Seeking Alpha • Dec 19
A Potential WeWork Ch.11 Filing Could Be Influenced By Details In The Bankruptcy Code
Summary WeWork continues to burn cash. They are facing a potential cash problem, especially after factoring in their huge accounts payable. SoftBank might be reluctant to loan needed cash, partially because of the risk of recharacterizing that loan as equity in Ch.11 under section 105(a). This is another example of a failed SPAC merger deal. It may come as no surprise to many that WeWork (WE) could file for bankruptcy in 2023 because they have a failed business model and have potential liquidity problems that are impacted by certain details in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Changes caused by the pandemic as to how and where people work had an overall negative impact on WeWork. They continue to burn cash and, even if SoftBank is willing to extend debt maturities, it will not be enough to keep them out of court, in my opinion. A world-wide recession could be the final catalyst that puts them in bankruptcy at least in the U.S. Data by YCharts (Note: the above price chart includes the earlier SPAC stock prices of BowX) Failed Business Model WeWork's business model is based on a basic old school real estate model that a number of my business associates have used for years. My business partners would lease the entire first floor of a commercial building in Manhattan and get very favorable leasing rates because they have a strong financial record. They would then divide the area into multiple units and rent those at much higher amounts per square foot to other businesses, which often resulted in very nice profits for my partners. WeWork leases large areas in an office building and then offers desk space and offices to those not able/willing to rent traditional offices. The problem for WeWork is the margin between what they pay and what they receive from their customers has not been enough to cover the very large administrative/marketing/advertising expenses. For example, WeWork had $2.397 billion nine-month total revenue and total lease expenses were $1.896 billion, which resulted in a $501 million gross profit margin. This $501 million did not cover the $406 million in other costs at locations, $578 million selling, general and administrative expenses, $116 million interest expense, and other income items. The bottom line result for the nine months was WeWork reported a loss of $629 million. 3Q and 9 Month Income Statement-2022 and 2021 sec.gov (Note: the results per share for 2022 reflect a much higher average number of shares outstanding than in 2021 because of the massive number of new shares issued under the SPAC merger transaction, which effectively reduces the reported loss per share.) Less than robust occupancy rates have had a negative impact on results. It is unclear what average occupancy rate level would result in finally breaking even. Optimal pricing for their services seems to be problematic for management as well, in my opinion. The dramatic change on where businesspeople actually now work as a result of the pandemic has had a negative impact on their already shaky operating model. Before the pandemic, many businesspeople wanted a business location to call their business "home" and there was a certain perceived stigma if a new business operated out of someone's house/apartment/basement/garage. That is no longer the case. The stigma is pretty much gone because even partners at major law firms and investment firms work from home now. Before people wanted access to a nice conference room if they needed to meet with customers. Now, meeting via Zoom is an accepted business practice. There is much less need/demand for a nice conference room. They can also use the old standard business lunch at a restaurant for a meeting. They don't really need WeWork services. WeWork has been closing some locations and in November they announced that 40 more locations will close. In Ch.11 in the U.S. under section 365 WeWork would have the potential to accept or reject leases, which is a strong incentive to go into Ch.11 to restructure. I covered the details involving leases and section 365 in a recent Bed Bath & Beyond (BBBY) article. The problem, however, is that more than half their offices are located outside of the U.S. and each country/location has their own regulations on leases and bankruptcy/administration/insolvency. There are potential problems regarding filing for bankruptcy in the U.S. and the impact on foreign operations, which I may cover in detail in a future article. Needing Additional Cash for Operations WeWork continues to burn cash and may need additional cash in the near future. This is amazing given that WeWork received $800 million (80 million shares) under a PIPE and $333 million from the SPAC trust account in October 2021 under a SPAC merger deal with BowX Acquisition Corp. Plus, they received an additional $150 million (15 million shares) from Cushman & Wakefield (CWK). For the first nine months of 2022, they used $645 million cash for operations. The problem currently is that their cash position as of September 30 is actually worse than it appears. They reported a cash position of $460 million, but if you add accounts receivable amount of $103 million to that number and then subtract out the huge accounts payable figure of $496 million, you get only $69 million. If WeWork continues to burn cash, these numbers could get even worse. This accounts payable number is troubling, in my opinion, because it is about 50% of total expenses in 3Q after deducting depreciation/amortization expenses. I don't know what to make of this. Are they not paying bills in a timely manner? The reality is that those owed money under accounts payable are effectively helping WeWork's cash liquidity. What happens if payment terms become more restrictive? Balance Sheet sec.gov Recharacterization of Debt to Equity in Bankruptcy Many investors expect that SoftBank (SFTBY) will loan WeWork additional cash to keep it afloat. That assertion, however, ignores some details in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. If WeWork eventually does file for Ch.11 bankruptcy that loan, in my opinion, could be recharacterized by a bankruptcy court as equity under section 105(a) and would, therefore, be in the same lowest class for recovery under a Ch.11 reorganization plan as WE shareholders. This is clearly a very complex issue. Claim holders, such as unsecured creditors, may assert in bankruptcy court that a new loan by SoftBank is actually equity interest in order for that claim class to get a better recovery under a Ch.11 reorganization plan because if the new loan is recharacterized as equity it would move down the priority level to the bottom. It could also be used just as a bargaining tool by various stakeholders, including WE shareholders, to get better recovery terms. The problem is that the various federal courts have different interpretations of the authority of a bankruptcy court to recharacterize debt as equity under section 105(a). SCOTUS in June 2017 granted a writ of certiorari for a case, PEM Entities LLC v. Eric M. Levin (16-492), that would have hopefully given some clarity on this issue. The case was never heard because the parties settled the case a few weeks after the writ was issued, and SCOTUS does not hear settled cases. (Interesting note on this SCOTUS case. One of Eddie Lampert's law firms was involved in this case. Why was the case settled and, therefore, not heard by SCOTUS? If SCOTUS ruled that a bankruptcy court could fairly easily decide under section 105(a) to recharacterize debt as equity it would have had an extremely negative impact, in my opinion, on Lampert because he had made many very large loans to Sears Holdings that might have been recharacterized as equity if Sears filed for bankruptcy.) If WeWork does eventually file for bankruptcy, I would expect them to file in the Southern District of New York because their headquarters is in Manhattan. In 2021, a SDNY bankruptcy court did recharacterize debt as equity interest in the Ch.11 case of Live Primary LLC. (Oddly, Live Primary was a shared office space startup company.) That decision was based mostly on AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 747-48 (6th Cir. 2001) that requires looking at a long list of factors for recharacterization, but the list was not to be used as a "scorecard" requiring that each one was to be met - they are just some guideline considerations. The factors: (1) the names given to the instruments, if any, evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date and schedule of payments; (3) the presence or absence of a fixed rate of interest and interest payments; (4) the source of repayments; (5) the adequacy or inadequacy of capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between the creditor and the stockholder; (7) the security, if any, for the advances; (8) the corporation's ability to obtain financing from outside lending institutions; (9) the extent to which the advances were subordinated to the claims of outside creditors; (10) the extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital assets; and (11) the presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide repayments.Seeking Alpha • Nov 09
WeWork Q3 2022 Earnings Preview
WeWork (NYSE:WE) is scheduled to announce Q3 earnings results on Thursday, November 10th, before market open. The consensus EPS Estimate is -$0.44 and the consensus Revenue Estimate is $865.07M (+30.9% Y/Y). Over the last 3 months, EPS estimates have seen 2 upward revisions and 1 downward. Revenue estimates have seen 0 upward revisions and 3 downward.분석 기사 • Nov 08
Should You Investigate WeWork Inc. (NYSE:WE) At US$2.75?
WeWork Inc. ( NYSE:WE ), is not the largest company out there, but it saw a significant share price rise of over 20% in...Seeking Alpha • Oct 27
WeWork: A Great Comeback Story
Summary WeWork has faced some tough times throughout the pandemic, but has many reasons for investors to be bullish on the aftermath. With set contracts driving sustainable revenues and new work culture pushing more work-from-home options, I believe they will be a core beneficiary. As a result, I am increasingly bullish on the company's near- and long-term prospects. WeWork (WE) has faced tough times during the COVID-19 pandemic, which forced and then dissuaded people from co-working spaces due to the transmission of disease and the likes. But now that the COVID-19 pandemic closures are (mostly) behind us, there has been a shift in culture which can aid in the company's comeback. WFH, or work from home, has become a part of corporate life in recent years and even after the pandemic, or rather especially after the pandemic, companies big and small have been adopting and offering different forms of hybrid working models to aid productivity or ease employee transitions back to the office. But an interesting thing I expect us to see more of is that even though many people are eager to get back into an office setting with co-workers and the likes, there is still going to be a significant portion of the population which enjoys and takes advantage of that flexibility. And with increasing time at home driving some un-easiness and employer stipends for work-from-home employees, companies like WeWork can potentially benefit from this as people seek out other workspaces. Shifting Work Priorities The most obvious pro for a company like WeWork is that the shift from traditional in-office work to work-from-home has continued even after the COVID-19 pandemic. This will result, I believe, in people eventually searching for a more flexible opportunity to work from which don't include busy and noisy coffee shops and the likes while still staying closer to home and avoiding the long and tiresome commute to work in bigger cities. According to a survey from McKinsey, 58% of US workers said they have the opportunity to work at least 1 day from home through their jobs. While that number doesn't mean much for WeWork, 35% of US workers reported having the ability to work from home five days a week. This number is significant. Because while there is undoubtedly a significant portion of those workers who will simply, well, work from home, there still may be a significant boost to people searching for different office or work-from-home style options. This is due to the lower commute time, flexibility of 'in-office' and 'out-of-office' times as well as noise pollution. A lot of employees who either have families or live in environments with roommates and the likes reported to want to find another place to work from. With some companies offering stipends for work-from-home, it can cover the roughly $300 per month cost of the WeWork membership program. This in turn should boost the company's memberships and revenues. Shifting Work Culture It's not just that existing companies are focusing on hybrid solutions for their employees to deal with burnout, longer and longer commute times and other factors, it's that the current work culture for a generation which has grown up fully online is changing. Some may say for the better and some may say for the worse. When people are now looking for new jobs, particularly young people, they look for a more flexible work schedule so they can find an appropriate work-life balance. But there's a catch here - even though this is something which younger people care more about in a new job, they are generally feeling less productive than older colleagues who work from home due to the lower socializing aspect of work, among other things. This means that while companies which are now hiring are focusing on hybrid work from home and in-office work, they may produce more stipends for remote work in WeWork-like places as an alternative to expensive office lease. The Company Is Well Positioned While the company has already-established contracts with remote workers, which are set to maintain a somewhat steady revenue stream for the longer run, they're working on not only an advertising and marketing push but also on working towards higher margins and profits by small price increases, added amenities with higher margins and eventually cutting some costs. The most recent quarter is a prime example - while they increased revenues from $593 million to $815 million, their SG&A (selling, general and administrative) expenses actually decreased from $899 million to $813 million. They also focused on equipping their offices and spaces with more sustainable products and services, which lowered their depreciation over the same period. Some pricing increases and other cost cutting efforts have led the company to increase their gross margins in the most recent quarter as well. As mentioned, while the company saw their revenues increase from $593 million to $815 million, the costs of those revenues were identical at $149 million, meaning there was significant gross margin expansion. While they enjoy the increased revenues, based on my aforementioned thesis, their focus on increasing profit margins may, I believe, result in the company reporting a profitable quarter or year sooner than expected. Expectations Are So So. For Now... Currently, the company is projected to report a rise in revenues of over 31%, from $2.57 billion in 2021 to $3.37 billion for the full current year. The company is then projected to report a 24% rise in revenues the following year to $4.16 billion and another 15% rise in revenues from 2024, to $4.78 billion. While this growth is slowing in nature, it's clear that the company is still growing at a high rate compared to the overall market as work from home and out-of-office work is becoming more of a norm. With the aforementioned factors, I believe that the company can outperform these figures as well. But it's not just about growing their sales, it's about increasing margins to put them in a position to generate meaningful cash flows. While their long term leases are their primary costs, it's important for them to work to minimize other expenses. According to projections, analysts are expecting them to do just that over the coming years. EPS, or net income per share, is projected to grow at a faster pace than sales. For the current full year of 2022, analysts are projecting that the company will report a near 70% decline in their loss per share, from a loss of $(7.15) to a loss of $(2.26). For 2023, they are projected to grow earnings per share by 53% to a loss of $(1.06) and then another rise of 71% to a loss of $(0.31).Seeking Alpha • Aug 12
WeWork: Coworking Experiences A Post-Pandemic Revival
WeWork's occupancy rate has recovered to the pre-pandemic figure. The company is set to see strong demand for its flexible coworking spaces. But this is set against strong losses that threaten its cash position. WeWork's (WE) occupancy rate dropped precipitously during the early days of the pandemic years, as stay-at-home orders kept people in their houses. The rise of WFH would then become a pertinent argument by bears, prophesying the end of all things that did not involve the internet. Hence, all notions that the pandemic would lead to permanent demand destruction went out the window when WeWork's fiscal 2022 second quarter earnings showed occupancy returning back to pre-pandemic levels. The percentage of total desks that were rented out had only just hit a low point of 46% during the worst of the pandemic. WeWork rightly pivoted to enterprise clients who were swapping long-term office leases for more short-term flexible working arrangements. The pandemic is now in the rearview mirror as the company attempts to improve profitability on the back of occupancy that has recovered. This might provide some solace for bulls who have seen WeWork's share price decline to newer lows over the last nine months as rising inflation, a weakening economy, and a hawkish FED drove investors away from riskier growth stocks. WE data by YCharts With its common shares currently changing hands at $5.58, the market cap of $4.07 billion is a long way away from the SoftBank-derived $47 billion valuation WeWork held when it was still private. The company faces somewhat of a bright future as large companies begin to divest fixed leases on emptying office space for more flexible working arrangements. WeWork offers these companies a distinct cost-saving package with the replacement of expensive corporate headquarters with beautifully designed workspaces in prime locations that their staff can access at any time. UK-based Curry's, one of the largest electronic retailers in the country, just abandoned its HQ in favour of WeWork's coworking spaces. As more of these pre-pandemic office leases come up for renewal around WeWork's core geographical markets, more businesses are likely going to assess the implications of renewal against the newer, more agile and creative workplace strategy being demanded by employees. The Curry's deal is one of the first times a large company has wholly abandoned its HQ for WeWork in the UK and likely won't be the last. Strong Occupancy Led Revenue Growth As Losses Improve WeWork's reported earnings for its fiscal 2022 second quarter saw revenue come in at $815 million, a 37.4% year-over-year increase but a miss of $9.31 million on consensus estimates. Net loss at $635 million was a 31% improvement from the year-ago quarter and included around $391 million in non-cash expenses. Further, EBITDA at negative $134 million, was a $315 million improvement from the comparable year-ago period and was within the company's guidance. The company's systemwide real estate portfolio now consists of 777 locations across 38 countries. This supports 917,000 desks and 658,000 physical memberships and was at an improved 72% occupancy during the quarter. Memberships also grew by 5% sequentially over the last quarter and 33% year-over-year. It's important to note that while occupancy has improved, revenue is still below its pre-pandemic peak. WeWork's management has described the company as a Space-as-a-Service play, putting the growing number of All Access memberships into focus. This grew to 62,000 subscriptions for a $180 million to $190 million annual run rate. WeWork's total access to liquidity, which includes cash and unused debt capacity, stood at $1.7 billion at the end of the quarter. The company's total cash burn during the quarter was just under $300 million against a cash component of its liquidity position that stood at $625 million. At the current rate of burn, WeWork's cash position will be exhausted within two quarters and the company will begin to lean heavily on debt to remain a going concern. This will put pressure on a balance sheet already strained by $3.2 billion in long-term debt.이 섹션에서는 일반적으로 전문 애널리스트들의 컨센서스 추정치를 기반으로 매출 및 이익 성장 전망을 제시하여 투자자들이 회사의 수익 창출 능력을 이해하도록 돕습니다. 그러나 WeWork는 과거 데이터가 충분하지 않고 애널리스트 예측도 없어, 과거 데이터를 단순히 외삽하거나 애널리스트 전망을 사용하여 향후 이익을 신뢰할 수 있게 계산할 수 없습니다.
Simply Wall St가 다루는 기업 중 97%는 과거 재무 데이터를 보유하고 있기 때문에, 이는 상당히 드문 상황입니다.
이익 및 매출 성장 예측
| 날짜 | 매출 | 이익 | 자유현금흐름 | 영업현금흐름 | 평균 애널리스트 수 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9/30/2023 | 3,335 | -1,855 | -1,037 | -807 | N/A |
| 6/30/2023 | 3,358 | -1,635 | -1,007 | -728 | N/A |
| 3/31/2023 | 3,329 | -1,863 | -1,002 | -679 | N/A |
| 12/31/2022 | 3,245 | -2,034 | -1,071 | -733 | N/A |
| 9/30/2022 | 3,115 | -2,701 | -1,393 | -1,018 | N/A |
| 6/30/2022 | 2,959 | -2,936 | -1,629 | -1,288 | N/A |
| 3/31/2022 | 2,737 | -3,248 | -1,991 | -1,709 | N/A |
| 12/31/2021 | 2,570 | -4,845 | -2,249 | -1,912 | N/A |
| 9/30/2021 | 2,518 | -4,864 | -2,403 | -1,978 | N/A |
| 6/30/2021 | 2,668 | -5,003 | -2,485 | -1,847 | N/A |
| 3/31/2021 | 2,957 | -4,977 | -2,502 | -1,584 | N/A |
| 12/31/2020 | 3,416 | -3,129 | -2,321 | -857 | N/A |
| 6/30/2020 | 3,862 | -3,623 | -3,660 | -418 | N/A |
| 3/31/2020 | 3,787 | -3,271 | -3,817 | -217 | N/A |
| 12/31/2019 | 3,459 | -3,265 | -3,977 | -448 | N/A |
| 6/30/2019 | 2,593 | -1,672 | -2,935 | -291 | N/A |
| 3/31/2019 | 2,208 | -1,557 | -2,609 | -211 | N/A |
| 12/31/2018 | 1,822 | -1,611 | -2,232 | -177 | N/A |
| 12/31/2017 | 886 | -884 | -788 | 244 | N/A |
| 12/31/2016 | 436 | -430 | N/A | 177 | N/A |
애널리스트 향후 성장 전망
수입 대 저축률: WEWK.Q 의 예상 수익 증가율이 절약률(2.4%)보다 높은지 판단하기에는 데이터가 부족합니다.
수익 vs 시장: WEWK.Q 의 수익이 US 시장보다 빠르게 성장할 것으로 예상되는지 판단하기에는 데이터가 부족합니다.
고성장 수익: WEWK.Q 의 수익이 향후 3년 동안 상당히 증가할 것으로 예상되는지 판단하기에는 데이터가 부족합니다.
수익 대 시장: WEWK.Q 의 수익이 US 시장보다 빠르게 증가할 것으로 예상되는지 판단하기에는 데이터가 부족합니다.
고성장 매출: WEWK.Q 의 수익이 연간 20%보다 빠르게 증가할 것으로 예상되는지 판단하기에는 데이터가 부족합니다.
주당순이익 성장 예측
향후 자기자본이익률
미래 ROE: WEWK.Q의 자본 수익률이 3년 후 높을 것으로 예상되는지 판단하기에 데이터가 부족합니다.
성장 기업 찾아보기
기업 분석 및 재무 데이터 상태
| 데이터 | 최종 업데이트 (UTC 시간) |
|---|---|
| 기업 분석 | 2024/06/11 21:30 |
| 종가 | 2024/06/11 00:00 |
| 수익 | 2023/09/30 |
| 연간 수익 | 2022/12/31 |
데이터 소스
당사의 기업 분석에 사용되는 데이터는 S&P Global Market Intelligence LLC에서 제공됩니다. 아래 데이터는 이 보고서를 생성하기 위해 분석 모델에서 사용됩니다. 데이터는 정규화되므로 소스가 제공된 후 지연이 발생할 수 있습니다.
| 패키지 | 데이터 | 기간 | 미국 소스 예시 * |
|---|---|---|---|
| 기업 재무제표 | 10년 |
| |
| 분석가 컨센서스 추정치 | +3년 |
|
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| 시장 가격 | 30년 |
| |
| 지분 구조 | 10년 |
| |
| 경영진 | 10년 |
| |
| 주요 개발 | 10년 |
|
* 미국 증권에 대한 예시이며, 비(非)미국 증권에는 해당 국가의 규제 서식 및 자료원을 사용합니다.
별도로 명시되지 않는 한 모든 재무 데이터는 연간 기간을 기준으로 하지만 분기별로 업데이트됩니다. 이를 TTM(최근 12개월) 또는 LTM(지난 12개월) 데이터라고 합니다. 자세히 알아보기.
분석 모델 및 스노우플레이크
이 보고서를 생성하는 데 사용된 분석 모델에 대한 자세한 내용은 당사의 Github 페이지에서 확인하실 수 있습니다. 또한 보고서 활용 방법에 대한 가이드와 YouTube 튜토리얼도 제공합니다.
Simply Wall St 분석 모델을 설계하고 구축한 세계적 수준의 팀에 대해 알아보세요.
산업 및 섹터 지표
산업 및 섹터 지표는 Simply Wall St가 6시간마다 계산하며, 프로세스에 대한 자세한 내용은 Github에서 확인할 수 있습니다.
분석가 소스
WeWork Inc.는 4명의 분석가가 다루고 있습니다. 이 중 0명의 분석가가 우리 보고서에 입력 데이터로 사용되는 매출 또는 수익 추정치를 제출했습니다. 분석가의 제출 자료는 하루 종일 업데이트됩니다.
| 분석가 | 기관 |
|---|---|
| William Catherwood | BTIG |
| Brett Knoblauch | Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. |
| Vikram Malhotra | Mizuho Securities USA LLC |