Seeking Alpha • Feb 17

Brookfield Corporation And The Complexity Discount

Summary Brookfield Corporation is misunderstood due to its complexity, creating a 'complexity discount' and an attractive entry point for informed investors. BN trades at an 18.9x DE multiple, not the headline 98x P/E, with distributable earnings compounding at 16% annually and a 15% future growth target. A sum-of-the-parts valuation estimates intrinsic value at $63 per share, 31% above the current price, supporting a Strong Buy rating. BN is positioned for growth via asset management inflows, AI infrastructure exposure, and expanding wealth solutions, with catalysts including AI spend and retirement account access. Read the full article on Seeking Alpha

Articolo di analisi • Jan 16

Investors Don't See Light At End Of Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd.'s (NYSE:BNT) Tunnel

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd.'s ( NYSE:BNT ) price-to-earnings (or "P/E") ratio of 11x might make it look like a buy...

Articolo di analisi • May 09

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd. (NYSE:BNT) Surges 30% Yet Its Low P/E Is No Reason For Excitement

Those holding Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd. ( NYSE:BNT ) shares would be relieved that the share price has rebounded...

Seeking Alpha • Apr 28

Brookfield Wealth Solutions: Not Buying This Dip

Summary I last covered Brookfield Wealth Solutions in November 2024, maintaining a hold rating despite a significant run-up in the stock. Since then, BNT shares have dropped, prompting a reassessment of the stock's performance and business updates to determine future investment strategies. BNT shares are fully convertible to Brookfield parent (BN) shares, causing BNT's performance to closely track BN's fortunes. The article evaluates BNT's share price performance and business updates to provide guidance on how to approach the stock moving forward. Read the full article on Seeking Alpha

Seeking Alpha • Dec 31

Brookfield: Why The Corporation Looks Better Positioned Than The Manager

Summary Both Brookfield Corporation and Brookfield Asset Management have delivered outstanding returns since my last bullish article. This article shows how BN and BAM earn money and focus on the implications going forward. Expected growth in Private Funds and BWS Capital should be in favor of BN due to the fee structure of BAM and spread earnings potential for BN. I downgrade BAM from "buy" to "hold" and BN from "strong buy" to "buy". Read the full article on Seeking Alpha

Seeking Alpha • Nov 29

Brookfield Wealth Solutions: Did I Get This Wrong?

Summary My initial hold rating missed a 72.5% return; revisiting Brookfield Wealth Solutions after rebranding and significant acquisitions, including American Equity Investment Life. It is time to reassess the stock. BNT's assets under management surged to over $100bn with the AEL acquisition; net income per share rose modestly by 14% despite heavy dilution. AEL's annuity products are attractive in a high-interest environment but come with longevity, market, and guarantee risks that could impact profitability. Despite BNT's strong shareholder returns and macro positives in the insurance sector, I remain cautious due to unclear strategy and potential undervaluation of risks. Read the full article on Seeking Alpha

Seeking Alpha • Jan 25

BPY Preferreds: A Backdoor Play On Brookfield Real Estate?

Summary Brookfield Corporation's real estate assets, when combined with its publicly held stakes in other entities, exceed the equity value of BN/BNRE.A. The upside could be material if BN/BNRE.A's IFRS book values turn out to be accurate. We explore whether BPY preferreds could be a backdoor plays for BN/BNRE.A's real estate. Read the full article on Seeking Alpha

Seeking Alpha • Dec 04

Brookfield Reinsurance: Smart Capital Raise To Fuel Growth But Skepticism Warranted

Summary Brookfield Reinsurance operates a capital solutions business providing insurance and reinsurance services with $47bn in assets under management. The company is part of the highly successful Brookfield Corporation. It is growing fast, and raising capital from its parent very efficiently. Business strategy is not clear and valuation compared to peers is not compelling. Read the full article on Seeking Alpha

Seeking Alpha • Feb 13

Brookfield Asset Management Reinsurance Partners declares $0.07 dividend

Brookfield Asset Management Reinsurance Partners (NYSE:BNRE) declare $0.07/share quarterly dividend Forward yield 0.76% Payable March 31; for shareholders of record March 16; ex-div March 15. See BNRE Dividend Scorecard, Yield Chart, & Dividend Growth.

Seeking Alpha • Jan 13

Brookfield: Misunderstood And Extremely Attractive

Summary Brookfield Corporation is the head of the difficult-to-understand empire. BN benefits from growth across all Brookfield entities and thus offers broad-based real asset investment exposure. BN is inexpensive and has considerable upside potential. Article Thesis Brookfield Corporation (BN), the newly created "mothership" of the Brookfield investment universe, is underfollowed and misunderstood by some investors. At current prices, it offers compelling returns over the coming years, I believe, thanks to an inexpensive valuation and considerable growth tailwinds. A Very Complicated Network Of Companies There used to be several Brookfield entities investors could pick from when making "real asset" investments. This includes the infrastructure business (BIP)(BIPC), the Renewable Energy business (BEP)(BEPC), the private equity business (BBU), the reinsurance business (BNRE), and the previous head of the empire, the "old" Brookfield Asset Management, which had the ticker 'BAM'. In a recent move, that old BAM was split up, however, as Brookfield decided it wanted to create an asset-light asset manager investors could invest in directly, without owning a stake in the "mothership". This new asset-light asset manager has taken over the ticker 'BAM', while Brookfield Corporation, the "mothership" that owns stakes in all the daughter entities, has started to trade under the ticker 'BN' in late 2022. Investors that want to own a stake in the head of the alternative asset management empire thus need to invest in 'BN', whereas 'BAM' is not the same company it used to be in the past -- it's not one of the daughter entities in the Brookfield empire, albeit an attractively priced one. All these name changes and complicated constructs, where one Brookfield entity owns stakes in other Brookfield entities, make the asset management empire hard to understand. This is why many investors don't want to invest in any Brookfield companies, as they feel overwhelmed by how complicated things are -- contrast this with a company like Apple (AAPL), where it is pretty clear what you get and where there is no reason to decide between different Apple entities. That is unfortunate, however, as the Brookfield empire provides a range of attractive investment opportunities, one of them being Brookfield Corporation itself, the head of the empire. Brookfield Corporation Benefits From Growth Across The Whole Empire The daughter entities are specialized, thus they only benefit from direct growth in their area of expertise. Brookfield Corporation, on the other hand, is an allrounder that is exposed to all the growth vectors across the empire -- it benefits from growing renewable investments via its stake in BEP, it benefits from the data center and pipeline businesses via its stake in BIP, it benefits from the growing asset management business via its stake in BAM, and so on. In short, every time there is any growth in any corner of the empire, BN, the head of the empire, benefits. An investment in BN thus offers broad-based exposure to the real asset investment world, in a way that is not possible via the more specialized daughter entities. For its publicly-traded daughter entities Brookfield Renewable Partners and Brookfield Infrastructure Partners, Brookfield has forecasted annual funds from operations growth in the high single digits. On top of that, they both offer mid-single digits dividend yields. It would thus not be surprising to see BN's stake in these companies deliver a low-teens annual return, which would be quite attractive. BN's stake in BAM, the recently-created asset-light asset management business, will likely deliver a higher return. With a dividend yield in the 4%-5% range and growth likely in the double-digits thanks to ongoing strong assets under management growth, BAM could deliver total returns in the 15%-20% range for BN (and outside investors), I believe. BN Is Inexpensive BN's exposure to BAM is larger compared to the other two Brookfield entities, as BN owns around $38 billion worth of BAM today, while its stakes in BEP and BIP are currently valued at around $9 billion and $7 billion, respectively. The more pronounced exposure to BAM, where I expect higher returns versus BEP and BIP, should juice BN's returns, all else equal. Between these three investments, BN thus owns around $54 billion worth of assets already. Of course, there are additional assets to consider. Brookfield's private equity business, BBU, does not receive a lot of attention, mainly due to the fact that its very low yield makes it uninteresting for income investors while the volatility of results makes BBU more complicated to value and understand. BN's exposure isn't very large, but at around $3 billion, it's not negligible, either. The value of BN's owned real estate portfolio is much more significant, especially since BN took its publicly-traded real estate daughter (Brookfield Property Partners or BPY) private a couple of years ago. These properties include office buildings and malls, two real estate categories that have not performed too well in recent years due to the pandemic, work-from-home trends, and so on. That being said, Brookfield's properties are generally high-quality ones (e.g. One Manhattan West in New York, Fashion Show in Las Vegas), where there is little risk that they will go unused, although rising interest rates result in rising cap rates, which depresses the value of these properties to some degree. That being said, the portfolio should still be worth many billions of dollars. Brookfield 2021 report In the 2021 Annual Report (the 2022 report isn't out yet), Brookfield stated that the common equity position of Brookfield Property Group, its fully-owned real estate business, was $32 billion. One can argue that this is too high, as the business generated just $750 million of funds from operations. We can go with the 2020 equity value to be conservative, which would mean slightly less than $20 billion in current value for Brookfield Corporation. There are also Brookfield's insurance business, assets on its balance sheet, and the carry it owns in the funds that are managed by the new BAM. All in all, this pencils out to a figure of around $100 billion. Of course, that has to be adjusted for BN's debt and preferreds, but even then, we get to around $85 billion or so. Accounting for BN's fully diluted share count of 1.61 billion (according to YCharts), we get to a per-share value of $53. Not all of these assets can be valued precisely, of course, and one can argue what cap rate to use for the real estate business, for example. But it is pretty clear that the per-share value of the assets that BN owns is significantly higher than the current share price of $35. BN is complicated, it is not a very straightforward business to invest in, and there is a small dividend yield only. A case can thus be made that it should trade at a discount compared to the value of all its holdings. But even if we round down the $53 estimate to $50 and apply another 20% discount, BN would still be undervalued today, as it trades at $35 versus a $40 "double-discounted" fair value. I thus am convinced that BN is currently a good value. That does not mean that shares will climb immediately or even in the foreseeable future, as it may take a while for the market to realize the value of BN. But for long-term-oriented investors, that should not be too much of a problem. The underlying value of the assets BN owns should climb in the long run, due to cash inflows from the daughter entities (dividends) and the real estate portfolio, while the value of these assets should climb over time as well.

Seeking Alpha • Dec 13

How To Make Money Off The Brookfield Spin-Off - Part 2

Summary After the spinoff, Brookfield investors have to allocate between BAM and BN. BN is the old BAM but owes only 75% of asset management. BAM is an asset-light manager. Both stocks are currently undervalued. BAM is expected to deliver better returns vs BN with higher yield and growth. It may become one of the best dividend payers. BN is significantly undervalued on a SOTP basis and may deliver comparable returns in case of material buybacks. This is an update to Part 1. It includes fresh data and responses to some of your comments. The readers are expected to be familiar with the subject as the Brookfield structure is fairly complicated, but I will provide a short background section for convenience. Background On Dec 12, investors who owned Brookfield Asset Management ("old BAM") in their brokerage accounts received a spinoff with the same name ("new BAM"). The "old BAM," meanwhile, was renamed to Brookfield Corporation. So now, we have two Brookfield stocks of two Canadian corporations trading on both NYSE and TSE - Brookfield Corporation (BN, TSE:BN.CA) and the new Brookfield Asset Management (BAM, TSE:BAM-A.CA). BN is the old BAM but owns only 75% of its asset management. The new BAM is responsible for asset management and nothing else. Both companies are so intertwined that the business remains effectively unified despite the split of tickers. The new BAM stock is supposed to unlock the value of the asset management segment and put its growth on steroids. To better understand the following, BN also has 3 public subsidiaries that exist in both partnership and corporate forms: Brookfield Infrastructure Partners (BIP, BIPC), Brookfield Renewables Partners (BEP, BEPC), and Brookfield Business Partners (BBU, BBUC). The fourth subsidiary, Brookfield Reinsurance Partners (BAMR), exists only in the partnership form. Brookfield Corporation as SOTP BN is a pure holding company now and we will start with a table representing it as the sum of the parts ((SOTP)). Author, Company Compiling this table I used BAM's Q3 Supplementary and market quotes for Brookfield Infrastructure, Brookfield Renewables, and Brookfield Business. We will not discuss their valuations. Carry from existing funds will belong 100% to BN. Carry from new funds will be split 2:1 between BAM and BN respectively. In some remote future, BN will receive 1/3+75%*2/3 ~ 83% of carry. Practically speaking we can ascribe all carry to BN today. From 2017 to 2021, Brookfield (together with Oaktree since 2019) generated net realized carry of $74, $188, $396, $348, and $715 in millions respectively. Q3 LTM number was $509. Averaging over the last three years, Brookfield generates about ~$500M of net carry annually. Applying a 10x multiple, the value of carry is ~$5B and this is the number in the table. It is conveniently close to the ~$6B in accumulated (but unrealized) net carry in Q3 which should be still discounted to its present value. Am I sure about 10x multiple? Not at all, but the input of carry is so small today that the crudeness of calculations hardly matters. I used Brookfield data for corporate assets, other investments (including important Brookfield Residential), and working capital. Based on Bruce Flatt's comments and the value of the Oaktree investment, I expect $3-4B in cash and assets have been transferred to the new BAM. There might be some small mistakes in these numbers but it makes sense to switch to more important line items - real estate, insurance, and asset management. Brookfield Property Group (BPG) BPG, the former BPY, consists of 3 segments: core office, core retail, and LP investments representing Brookfield contributions into its private funds. BPG/BPY was formed through a spin-off from the mothership in 2013 and started growing by acquiring companies in which it owned partial stakes such as Brookfield Office Properties (BPO) and Canary Wharf in London. Everything was going smoothly but even at this time, it was trading consistently below its IFRS book value. For example, my records show that in 2015 it was trading at more than a 20% discount from its book value. But the worst was yet to come. One of the companies partially owned by BPY was General Growth Properties (GGP) which BPY, after some adventures, acquired in full in 2018. It was a contrarian bet as GGP owned malls, and the term "death of malls" was already coined. The market was not charmed. In early 2020, before the pandemic, I posted on Brookfield subs and registered a ~40% discount from the BPY book value. If we trust the market to value BIP and BEP, we should respect BPY market valuations as well. For many reasons, investors kept disliking BPY and in 2021, Brookfield had to take it back private. The pandemic may have further negatively affected BPG/BPY value and that is why I used a 25-50% discount from the IFRS book value in the table. Accounting also suggests some caution. IFRS (contrary to conservative GAAP) requires periodic revaluation of properties attempting to present their fair values. This can be done rather reliably with comps for some standard properties. For complex properties of BPG's portfolio, comps are hardly applicable. Instead, Brookfield projects rental cash flows and determines the properties' fair values using discount rates and terminal cap rates. To illustrate the process, here is a table from the Q3 BPY filing (BPY's preferreds are trading publicly and the company has to issue quarterly reports): BPY filings How confident can one be of the terminal rate in 10 years being precisely 5.3%? How confident can one be of the discount rate to remain precisely at 7.0% during 2022 despite the general rate increase? Certainly, this valuation method is approximate by its nature and we would like to test it using real-world transactions. The situation with actual sales varies across the segments. LP is supposed to be the riskiest but Brookfield sells properties in this segment regularly exiting private funds. We know that Brookfield's real estate funds are successful and the company records big disposition gains on its net income account supporting IFRS valuations. In the Office segment, Brookfield sells properties (or interests in them) occasionally and almost always at slight premiums to their IFRS values. This means that at least some properties are valued correctly but does not prove that assets are valued conservatively in general. Finally, I am not aware of significant sales in the Retail segment and valuations in this segment remain unproven. Based on the latest BPY filing, the current value of all properties is ~$62B (with ~$20B in the Retail segment) plus another ~$19B in equity-accounted investments. Due to high leverage, a 20% inaccuracy in properties' valuations may halve BN's real estate equity. Without granular market data about properties (in particular, weaker retail properties), the discount to IFRS value, in my opinion, is warranted. To be fair, a 50% discount is, most likely, overkill. But I would like to mark the lowest possible (within reason) valuation for BN. Insurance solutions The book value of BAM's insurance business - Brookfield Reinsurance (BAMR) - is ~$4B (as a reminder: BAMR stock price is linked to BN and BN analysis is equally applicable to BAMR). The management values the business at exactly twice its book value. This implies 20% ROE which is achievable in the short run as Brookfield keeps reinvesting cash and short-term securities at much higher yields. I am not sure this ROE is sustainable in the long run nor can I disprove it. Apollo's Athene (APO) (ATH) has been achieving ROE of ~15% and higher for many years while modestly leveraged and having excess capital. BAMR may use higher leverage and be less conservative since BN provides an implicit backstop. I am almost certain that the insurance business should be valued at a significant premium to its book value. However, the business is still very young and has not generated a reliable track record. This is the reason why I still use its book value on the low side. The new BAM We already have early trading data for the new BAM, but it is too fresh to rely upon. We know now that Q1 23 dividend for BAM will be $1.28 annualized. This is significantly higher than my predictions in Part 1. Q3 filings that appeared after my post cannot explain it. Perhaps, it is due to the strong Q4 performance that only Brookfield knows about for now. In Part 1, I assumed that BAM would be trading on yield since the company will be paying out 90% of its earnings and based on comps, predicted a trading range within a 3-4% yield or $32-43 using the just announced dividend. I may have found a better comp since. One can dissect alternative asset managers by two main attributes: a) asset-light or asset-heavy and b)the importance of recurring (primarily management) fees in the realized (or distributable) income. The new BAM is asset-light and recurring fees (mostly management fees) dwarf performance-based income such as carry or performance income from BBU appreciation. Out of big alternative asset managers, only Ares Management (ARES) shares the same attributes. Moreover, while Ares receives some performance income, its dividend policy is mostly linked to recurring FRE (fee-related income). Both Ares and Brookfield keep growing their FGAUM (fee-generating assets under management) at a similar clip of ~20%. Here are Ares dividend yields in 2021-22 (2020 is not representative because of the pandemic): Author BAM has several edges compared with Ares. First, it is a better-known name. Secondly, its top management is holding the same shares that are available to retail investors (Ares management owns partnership units in addition to shares). But it is the third edge that matters. Asset-heavy managers have an important advantage compared with their asset-light peers: they can contribute significant equity of their own to private funds achieving the so-called alignment of interests with clients. No doubt it helps in fundraising. At the same time, asset-light managers can grow faster and have better ROE. Brookfield's approach combines both advantages! BAM is asset-light but still enjoys the alignment of interests because of BN's contributions to the funds. I believe this unique feature goes to the very core of Brookfield's design. BAM is expected to trade at least at the same yield as Ares but not necessarily right away - it takes time for a new stock to settle at its trading range. At a 3.5% yield, it corresponds to ~$37 stock price (for your reference: my comp from Part 1 (BIPC) is currently trading at a 3.3% yield which implies a still higher price for BAM). BAM constitutes roughly half of BN's SOTP value. If we expect BAM to trade, say, 20% higher than today, it should pull BN ~10% higher as well. BN vs BAM I have received a lot of questions about it. How Brookfield shareholders are supposed to allocate between two tickers? Based on SOTP, BN seems severely undervalued today even with BAM trading at ~$33. It is also rather clear that BN's progress will depend mostly on real estate, insurance, and asset management. Values of real estate and insurance are firmly linked to their IFRS book values.

Seeking Alpha • Nov 10

Brookfield Asset Management Reinsurance Partners declares $0.14 dividend

Brookfield Asset Management Reinsurance Partners (NYSE:BAMR) declares $0.14/share quarterly dividend, in line with previous. Forward yield 1.25% Payable Dec. 30; for shareholders of record Nov. 30; ex-div Nov. 29. See BAMR Dividend Scorecard, Yield Chart, & Dividend Growth.

Seeking Alpha • Aug 29

Elusive Cash Of Brookfield Business Partners

Summary BBU has been operating quite successfully but due to its structure, BAM has been and will remain by far the main beneficiary. Limited shareholders receive small distributions which are never supposed to grow. Their returns depend almost exclusively on capital gains. Excluding the short period upon the spinoff, BBU has not appreciated in a persistent way. Future gains remain questionable primarily because of incentive distributions and BBU does not qualify for buy and hold strategy. I published negatively on Brookfield Business Partners (BBU) (BBUC) before ("The Siren Song of Brookfield Business Partners") and for a while, considered the case too obvious to revisit in depth. However, comments by one of my readers changed my mind. For the rest of this post, I will be talking about Brookfield Business in its BBU form (partnership) but my arguments equally relate to BBUC as well (BBUC is a twin corporation with its share price linked to the BBU unit price). Brookfield Business Partners' structure BBU is a private equity arm of Brookfield Asset Management (BAM). It means that BBU acquires (or invests in) companies that are often but not necessarily in trouble, fixes or improves their operations, and, in several years, sells them through IPOs or privately at much higher prices. The companies that BBU pursues belong to various industries from financials to business services to manufacturing. Thus BBU has a broader investment mandate than other Brookfield's investment arms such as public Brookfield Infrastructure (BIP) (BIPC), Brookfield Renewable (BEP) (BEPC), Brookfield Reinsurance (BAMR), and private Brookfield Property Group that once used to be public (BPY). BBU is a partnership managed externally by BAM as its Managing General Partner. The management terms are governed by the so-called Master Services Agreement which is a rather long document. Among other things, the document directly states that the Managing General Partner does not have any fiduciary duties or any obligations regarding Limited Partners, i.e. BBU unitholders. In other words, BBU is not run in the interests of its unitholders but exclusively in the interests of BAM. Still, BAM owns about two-thirds of BBU's limited partners. BAM's interests in running BBU can be itemized as follows: BBU pays BAM 1.25% of its total capitalization in annual management fees. Besides management fees, BAM is entitled to incentive distributions (or performance fees) equal to 20% of an increase in the volume-weighted average unit price of BBU over an established incentive distribution threshold. This threshold is calculated quarterly and is currently $31.53. If at the end of a quarter BBU's volume-weighted average unit price exceeds this threshold, a new and higher threshold is established similar to the high watermark for hedge funds. BBU represents BAM's capital in private equity funds that BAM raises periodically from third parties. BAM's policy is to invest alongside its limited partners in private funds ("alignment of interests") and in this regard, BAM differs favorably from some of its peers. Through public BBU, BAM typically invests close to 25% of capital into private equity funds. All three items are important for BAM but without much hesitation, I would point to the third one as the most important. Alignment of interests helps BAM to attract outside investors to its private funds. BAM is entitled to receive similar management fees and carry instead of incentive distributions on this external capital. Crucially, the capitalization of private equity funds far exceeds the capitalization of BBU (just for the latest private equity fund, Brookfield seeks $15B in capital vs. ~$4B of BBU and BBUC combined market cap). For BAM, BBU's cash is designated (in the order of importance) to accomplish the alignment of interests, pay management fees, and pay performance fees once BBU is lucky enough to exceed its threshold. What is left for BBU's limited unitholders? In terms of cash, not much: BBU pays 25 cents in annual distributions (~1% yield) which are not designed to grow. BAM indicates explicitly that limited unitholders are supposed to receive returns via capital gains rather than distributions. At this point, you might wonder why BBU pays out precious cash at all. I guess cash distributions make BBU investable for certain institutional and retail investors that otherwise would not be allowed by their mandate or willing to invest. Elusive unit appreciation In its own way, BBU is highly successful. In my opinion, it is managed brilliantly and with amazing creativity. Some of BBU's feats - such as the Westinghouse transaction or GrafTech's (EAF) transformation - are second to none. Mistakes have been made (for example, Teekay Offshore, currently Altera Infrastructure) but they have been rare and isolated. From BAM's standpoint, BBU's success manifests itself in scaling up its private equity funds (in terms of assets under management) with the related growth in management fees and carry. As a BAM shareholder, I am quite happy. Have limited shareholders beensuccessful? You can judge yourself from the following chart: BBU unit price (Seeking Alpha) Upon BBU's spinoff in 2016, the units were cheap and quickly appreciated. However, there has been no further progress since mid-2018. In my first piece on BBU, I anticipated this and stated the following (I apologize for quoting myself but cannot state it better today): "... the worst disadvantage for investors is BBU's incentive distributions or "performance fees" as Brookfield calls them. Other subsidiaries pay them as well but they are tied to stable distributions rather than the fickle stock market. Typically, people invest for two reasons: either to get income (irrelevant for BBU) or to enjoy significant capital growth in return for facing stock market risks. In BBU's case, the reward/risk balance is highly asymmetric. If BBU is successful its unit price may grow beyond its high watermark threshold. At that time, 20% of the market cap increase IN CASH goes to BAM. Moreover, at the same moment of high unit prices, BBU is likely to issue additional units diluting investors. Sooner or later, the fickle market may go down again but the cash is irrevocably gone... So, BAM enjoys the benefits of market fluctuations at the expense of retail investors." Some investors may think that since BAM owns two-thirds of BBU, limited unitholders' interests are aligned with BAM's. In a way this is correct: provided everything else is equal, BAM is interested in higher unit prices (sometimes, BBU even repurchases its units). But this is only when everything else is equal! As we have seen this is not necessarily the case as BAM has other priorities. Why does BAM need BBU at all? Without public BBU, BAM would have to provide an alignment of interests for big institutional investors using only its own capital. With BBU, BAM can use other people's money for the same purpose and milk this money at the same time by charging fees. Again: as a BAM shareholder, I can only admire the efficiency of these operations! My reader (who triggered writing this post) knows Brookfield's business quite well. He knows that BAM's business is driven by fees and understands what incentive distributions are about. Let me quote his comments on my opinion regarding BBU from one of my recent posts: I also disagree that BBU is not suitable for long-term holdings because of the incentive structure. All of the subs BIP, BEP, BBU pay incentives to BAM but are still able to deliver outsized returns to unit holders even after paying those fees. BIP and BEP pay them based on FFO, and BBU pays them based on unit price. If anything, an incentive based on unit price is more closely aligned with outside investors who own the units. BBU has produced 15-18% returns on NAV every year since inception even after these distributions, though the unit price has languished. At around 2/3 of NAV, it is by far the cheapest of all BAM subs. In 2021 BBU paid incentive distributions of $157M in a year when they earned about $1.7 billion in cash flow from operations. Their investments are all cash flow positive and they cover their distributions to BAM and to their own unit holders many, many times over. Not sure why you think these fees are "enormous" or somehow make it unworthy of investment. The unit price could double and they'd easily cover these distributions 10 times over from their own cash flows. Please note that trading in BBU units can be successful - I do not deny it. For example, with units currently at ~$22 and the threshold at $31.53, there is plenty of room for appreciation. It is no more than my personal preference to avoid trading. I keep referring to one of Buffett's rules: if you do not feel comfortable owning a stock for 10 years, you should not own it for 10 minutes. In this regard, BBU hardly fits the bill.

Seeking Alpha • Aug 11

Brookfield Asset Management Reinsurance Partners GAAP EPS of $0.06, revenue of $1.45B

Brookfield Asset Management Reinsurance Partners press release (NYSE:BAMR): Q2 GAAP EPS of $0.06. Revenue of $1.45B.

Seeking Alpha • Jun 20

Brookfield And Other Alternative Asset Managers Are Trading As If There Were No Tomorrow

An increase in interest rates and high inflation have not affected the business model of BAM and other alternative asset managers. A spin-off of the asset management business should make BAM easier to value and is expected to provide a 20-30% uplift for investors. Investors can exploit the high stock market volatility in shares of BAM, APO, and other alternative managers to buy them cheaply.

Seeking Alpha • Apr 22

Brookfield Asset Management: Top Stock For A High Inflation Environment

Brookfield Asset Management (BAM) is a premier global alternative asset management business we believe will benefit from the inflationary environment. Brookfield's compounded annualized return has been ~20%, and we believe the company can continue to deliver this level of returns thanks to tailwinds it is likely to benefit from. These tailwinds include inflation, thanks to BAM's focus on real assets financed by fixed-rate debt, as well as growth from new strategies such as insurance.

Punteggio fiocco di neve
Valutazione	0/6
Crescita futura	0/6
Prestazioni passate	2/6
Salute finanziaria	4/6
Dividendi	0/6

Prezzi storici delle azioni
Prezzo attuale dell'azione	US$46.44
Massimo di 52 settimane	US$49.86
Minimo di 52 settimane	US$36.81
Beta	1.67
Variazione di 1 mese	10.70%
Variazione a 3 mesi	2.88%
Variazione di 1 anno	20.02%
Variazione a 3 anni	120.58%
Variazione a 5 anni	n/a
Variazione dall'IPO	12.17%

	BNT	US Insurance	US Mercato
7D	2.9%	-1.5%	3.2%
1Y	20.0%	-9.8%	31.0%

BNT volatility
BNT Average Weekly Movement	4.4%
Insurance Industry Average Movement	4.4%
Market Average Movement	7.1%
10% most volatile stocks in US Market	16.1%
10% least volatile stocks in US Market	3.2%

BNT statistiche fondamentali
Capitalizzazione di mercato	US$15.46b
Utili (TTM)	US$766.00m
Ricavi(TTM)	US$11.64b

BNT Conto economico (TTM)
Ricavi	US$11.64b
Costo del fatturato	US$7.98b
Profitto lordo	US$3.66b
Altre spese	US$2.89b
Utili	US$766.00m

Utile per azione (EPS)	2.30
Margine lordo	31.42%
Margine di profitto netto	6.58%
Rapporto debito/patrimonio netto	49.4%

Dati	Ultimo aggiornamento (ora UTC)
Analisi dell'azienda	2026/05/07 06:18
Prezzo dell'azione a fine giornata	2026/05/07 00:00
Utili	2025/12/31
Utili annuali	2025/12/31

Pacchetto	Dati	Tempistica	Esempio Fonte USA ^*
Dati finanziari della società	10 anni	Conto economico Rendiconto finanziario Bilancio	Modulo SEC 10-K Modulo SEC 10-Q
Stime di consenso degli analisti	+3 anni	Previsioni finanziarie Obiettivi di prezzo degli analisti	Rapporti di ricerca degli analisti Blue Matrix
Prezzi di mercato	30 anni	Prezzi delle azioni Dividendi, scissioni e azioni	Dati di mercato ICE Modulo SEC S-1
Proprietà	10 anni	Top azionisti Insider trading	Modulo 4 SEC Modulo 13D SEC
Gestione	10 anni	Team di leadership Consiglio di amministrazione	Modulo SEC 10-K Modulo SEC DEF 14A
Sviluppi principali	10 anni	Annunci aziendali	Modulo 8-K SEC

Brookfield Wealth Solutions (BNT) Panoramica del titolo

Analisi del rischio

Concorrenti di Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd.

Unum Group

Globe Life

Principal Financial Group

Primerica

Storia dei prezzi e prestazioni

Notizie e aggiornamenti recenti

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd., Annual General Meeting, Jul 16, 2026

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd. (NYSE:BNT) completed the acquisition of Just Group plc (LSE:JUST) from a group of shareholders.

Full year 2025 earnings released: EPS: US$2.30 (vs US$3.34 in FY 2024)

Upcoming dividend of US$0.07 per share

Brookfield Corporation And The Complexity Discount

Fourth quarter dividend of US$0.07 announced

Recent updates

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd., Annual General Meeting, Jul 16, 2026

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd. (NYSE:BNT) completed the acquisition of Just Group plc (LSE:JUST) from a group of shareholders.

Full year 2025 earnings released: EPS: US$2.30 (vs US$3.34 in FY 2024)

Upcoming dividend of US$0.07 per share

Brookfield Corporation And The Complexity Discount

Fourth quarter dividend of US$0.07 announced

Full year 2025 earnings released: EPS: US$2.49 (vs US$3.34 in FY 2024)

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd. Declares Quarterly Distribution Increase, Payable on March 31, 2026

Now 21% undervalued after recent price drop

Investors Don't See Light At End Of Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd.'s (NYSE:BNT) Tunnel

Upcoming dividend of US$0.06 per share

Third quarter dividend of US$0.06 announced

Third quarter 2025 earnings released: EPS: US$1.37 (vs US$0.20 in 3Q 2024)

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd. Declares Quarterly Return of Capital on Class A and Class B Shares, Payable on December 31, 2025

Upcoming dividend of US$0.09 per share

Second quarter dividend of US$0.09 announced

Second quarter 2025 earnings released: EPS: US$2.07 (vs US$1.53 in 2Q 2024)

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd. (NYSE:BNT) agreed to acquire Just Group plc (LSE:JUST) from a group of shareholders for £2.3 billion.

Upcoming dividend of US$0.09 per share

First quarter dividend of US$0.09 announced

First quarter 2025 earnings released: US$1.34 loss per share (vs US$2.30 profit in 1Q 2024)

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd. (NYSE:BNT) Surges 30% Yet Its Low P/E Is No Reason For Excitement

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd. Declares Quarterly Return of Capital on Class A Share and Class B Share, Payable on June 30, 2025

Brookfield Wealth Solutions: Not Buying This Dip

Brookfield Wealth Solutions Ltd., Annual General Meeting, Jun 10, 2025

Investor sentiment deteriorates as stock falls 17%

Full year 2024 earnings released: EPS: US$4.96 (vs US$5.47 in FY 2023)

Upcoming dividend of US$0.09 per share

Fourth quarter dividend increased to US$0.09

Brookfield Reinsurance Ltd. Declares Quarterly Distribution, Payable on March 31, 2025

Full year 2024 earnings released: EPS: US$7.06 (vs US$5.47 in FY 2023)

Brookfield: Why The Corporation Looks Better Positioned Than The Manager

Upcoming dividend of US$0.08 per share

Brookfield Wealth Solutions: Did I Get This Wrong?

Third quarter dividend of US$0.08 announced

Third quarter 2024 earnings released: EPS: US$0.30 (vs US$0.68 in 3Q 2023)

Brookfield Reinsurance Ltd. Declares Quarterly Distribution, Payable on December 31, 2024

Upcoming dividend of US$0.08 per share

Second quarter dividend of US$0.08 announced

Second quarter 2024 earnings released: EPS: US$1.82 (vs US$7.01 in 2Q 2023)

Brookfield Reinsurance Ltd. Declares Quarterly Distribution, Payable on September 27, 2024

Brookfield Reinsurance Ltd., Annual General Meeting, Jul 22, 2024

Upcoming dividend of US$0.08 per share

First quarter 2024 earnings released: EPS: US$2.30 (vs US$1.89 loss in 1Q 2023)

Fourth quarter dividend of US$0.08 announced

Brookfield Reinsurance Ltd. Declares Quarterly Distribution, Payable on June 28, 2024

Brookfield Reinsurance Ltd. (NYSE:BNRE), Bam Re Partners Trust, Bam Re Holdings Ltd., North End Re (Cayman) SPC and Freestone Re Ltd. completed the acquisition of remaining 79.62% stake in American Equity Investment Life Holding Company (NYSE:AEL).

Full year 2023 earnings released: EPS: US$5.47 (vs US$9.87 in FY 2022)

Upcoming dividend of US$0.08 per share

Full year 2023 earnings released: EPS: US$7.07 (vs US$9.69 in FY 2022)

Fourth quarter dividend increased to US$0.08

BPY Preferreds: A Backdoor Play On Brookfield Real Estate?

Now 21% undervalued

Now 21% undervalued

Upcoming dividend of US$0.07 per share at 0.8% yield

Brookfield Reinsurance: Smart Capital Raise To Fuel Growth But Skepticism Warranted

Brookfield Reinsurance Ltd. (NYSE:BNRE) completed the acquisition of Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. from Voce Capital Management, LLC, Pzena Investment Management LLC and other shareholders.

New major risk - Shareholder dilution

Third quarter 2023 earnings released: EPS: US$1.47 (vs US$4.79 in 3Q 2022)

Brookfield Reportedly Weighs Move into UK Pension Insurance Market

Brookfield Reinsurance Ltd. Declares Quarterly Distribution, Payable on September 29, 2023

Upcoming dividend of US$0.07 per share at 1.6% yield

Brookfield Reinsurance Ltd. Announces Board Appointments

Brookfield Reinsurance Ltd. Declares Quarterly Distribution, Payable on September 29, 2023