BowFlex Inc.

OTCPK:BFXX.Q Rapport sur les actions

Capitalisation boursière : US$3.6k

This company is no longer active

The company may no longer be operating, as it may be out of business. Find out why through their latest events.

BowFlex Résultats passés

Passé contrôle des critères 0/6

Les bénéfices de BowFlex ont diminué à un taux annuel moyen de -16.2%, tandis que le secteur Leisure a vu ses bénéfices augmenter de en baisse à 8.9% par an. Les revenus ont augmenté de en baisse à un taux moyen de 5.7% par an.

Informations clés

-16.20%

Taux de croissance des bénéfices

-13.77%

Taux de croissance du BPA

Leisure Croissance de l'industrie16.88%
Taux de croissance des recettes-5.71%
Rendement des fonds propresn/a
Marge nette-43.88%
Dernière mise à jour des bénéfices31 Mar 2024

Mises à jour récentes des performances passées

Recent updates

Article d’analyse • Oct 02

Nautilus (NYSE:NLS) Has Debt But No Earnings; Should You Worry?

Legendary fund manager Li Lu (who Charlie Munger backed) once said, 'The biggest investment risk is not the volatility...
Article d’analyse • Aug 10

Should You Investigate Nautilus, Inc. (NYSE:NLS) At US$1.00?

Nautilus, Inc. ( NYSE:NLS ), might not be a large cap stock, but it received a lot of attention from a substantial...
Seeking Alpha • May 29

Nautilus: Cheap Price Does Not Mean Undervalued

Summary Nautilus fell from its high of $30 to $1.3. Demand is weakening, and Nautilus can’t do anything about it. The best play may be selling its children's brands. The price is near liquidation, which I believe is at around $0.85. Read the full article on Seeking Alpha
Article d’analyse • Feb 14

What You Need To Know About The Nautilus, Inc. (NYSE:NLS) Analyst Downgrade Today

The latest analyst coverage could presage a bad day for Nautilus, Inc. ( NYSE:NLS ), with the analysts making...
Article d’analyse • Feb 12

Nautilus (NYSE:NLS) Has Debt But No Earnings; Should You Worry?

Legendary fund manager Li Lu (who Charlie Munger backed) once said, 'The biggest investment risk is not the volatility...
Seeking Alpha • Feb 09

Nautilus GAAP EPS of -$0.35 misses by $0.07, revenue of $98.08M misses by $5.42M

Nautilus press release (NYSE:NLS): Q3 GAAP EPS of -$0.35 misses by $0.07. Revenue of $98.08M (-33.4% Y/Y) misses by $5.42M. JRNY Total Members Reaches Approximately 450k with 88% Growth vs Q3 Fiscal 2022 Full Year 2023 The Company expects full year revenue of about $270 million compared to the previous range of $315 million to $365 million. The decline in revenue is primarily due to lower expectations in the Retail segment. The Company now expects full year Adjusted EBITDA1 loss (excluding restructuring costs) to be approximately $50 million compared to the prior range of Adjusted EBITDA(1) loss of between $30 million and $40 million. The Company is targeting JRNY Members to be approximately 500,000 at March 31, 2023.
Seeking Alpha • Oct 01

Nautilus: Buy For The Potential Buyout? Meh

Summary Nautilus recently announced that it was exploring strategic alternatives, including a potential sale of the entire company. As the company continues to lose ground and move into a deeper unhealthy financial position, the risks associated with an acquisition falling through are greater than M&A arbitrage, I believe. As a result, even if a purely speculative position may be okay, I don't believe the risk-reward profile fits a traditional M&A arbitrage and will not be holding a position. Earlier this month, Nautilus (NLS) announced that its board was discussing the potential sale of the company as part of them exploring strategic alternatives. While this way forward makes sense to me given the OPC (one product company) nature of the company, the real question is at what premium to their current share price, if at all, is this potential transaction going to take place? Let's explore the company and try to get a sense of that. Declining Company Fundamentals While the company's products are sound, they lack the hype factor of companies like Peloton (PTON), which caused them some headaches when trying to market the products to gyms and for personal use. Unsurprisingly, the company saw a surge in sales during the pandemic as a good chunk of the world remained locked down in one way or another and many sought out alternatives to gyms, which were mostly closed. The company's revenues surged from $309 million in 2019 to almost $665 million in 2021, more than doubling over a period of just 2 years. Since then, however, the company's sales have been declining as they both are unable to find that comparative growth, like most other companies in the field, as well as losing ground in services, or the 'interactive' part of their products to companies like Peloton and other private companies. In 2022, the company reported a decline in sales to just shy of $590 million and their current projections for the upcoming fiscal year call for a decline of almost 33% to $397 million and then a 9% increase in the following year to $434 million. Margins Not Too Hot Either With great pandemic-sales power, comes great operational expenses responsibilities. And with that higher sales volume came higher operational expenses, which rose from just over $100 million annually to over $160 million annually. This has, along with the slightly higher cost of revenues, caused the company to report a loss for fiscal 2022, and that loss is expected to deepen dramatically in the coming fiscal year. After reporting EPS of $2.67 in the year with record revenues, the company reported a loss of $(0.72) in the last fiscal year and is expected to report a much deeper loss this coming year. Based on the same analyst projections, the company is expected to report an EPS loss of $(2.56) for the coming fiscal year, followed by a 75% rise the following year, to a loss of $(0.68). But it's not like the company has some cash reserves to fall back on to maintain operational efficiency or fund operations through an acquisition. Low Cash, High Debt The company currently has one of its lowest ever cash positions at just $7.3 million in cash and equivalents, no short-term investment to divest from and no trading asset securities like previous years to generate any meaningful interest income. On top of that, they have one of their highest ever long-term debt position at $34.7 million, on which they are paying more than $1.6 million annually as interest rates rise in the United States and around the world as inflation runs relatively high. This means that the company will have to either fund operations in the coming few years through issuing more debt, making a buyout less appealing, or making equity offerings, which will further dilute shareholder value and subsequently lower the price per share of a buyout offer, if one may come. Buyout Opportunity - I Just Don't Know Given the fact that Nautilus is an established company with relationships with vendors and manufacturing facilities, it's clear that they CAN be a valuable asset to a private equity company that owns fitness gyms or has some fitness portfolio. I'm not so sure about a public company buyout like Peloton or others, since there's little incentive for that to happen. With the company's $100 million in inventory and still-solid $400 million range revenues projection for the coming year, there is certainly an incentive for someone who can significantly lower the costs of Nautilus and thus generate some profits in the coming year. But at what price? Earlier last year, apparel company Lululemon (LULU) announced it was buying Mirror, a home fitness company, for $500 million as part of its investment in overall fitness markets to expand its reach and avenues to sell their clothing. While I don't think Nautilus will fit their brand, other companies which are hurting from the volatility, which is the apparel and fitness markets, can benefit from having subscription-based services companies and hardware companies in their portfolio. While I'm not going to name names, it's clear that there is a market present for buyers for Nautilus, whether it be athletic companies, athletic apparel companies or private equity with fitness portfolios looking to enhance their reach. Is It Worth A Speculative Buy? It's hard to set a value on the company's worth to a buyer without knowing the portfolio they're trying to expand, but with a book value hovering around $3 per share and an enterprise value of around $100 million, the highest possible potential value the company has is probably around double where it is now. However, there's going to be a discount for the company given their higher debt load as a percentage of the value as well as the fact they're not expected to make anything resembling a profit for quite some time.
Seeking Alpha • Aug 09

Nautilus GAAP EPS of -$1.92 misses by $1.20, revenue of $54.82M beats by $4.16M

Nautilus press release (NYSE:NLS): Q1 GAAP EPS of -$1.92 misses by $1.20. Revenue of $54.82M (-70.3% Y/Y) beats by $4.16M. Gross profit margins were 12.7% compared to 30.1% last year. The 17.4 ppt decrease in gross margins was primarily due to increased discounting (-8 ppts), unfavorable logistics overhead absorption (-8 ppts), and increased investments in JRNY (-4 ppts), offset by improvement in other costs (3 ppts). Reiterates FY 2022 Guidance: The company expects full year revenue of between $380 million and $460 million vs. consensus of $398.60 million. Gross margins for the second half of the year are expected to be in the range of 27% to 30%. The company expects to deliver positive Adjusted EBITDA for the 2nd half of FY 2023. As a result, the Company expects full year Adjusted EBITDA loss of between $25 million and $35 million. Shares -6%.

Ventilation des recettes et des dépenses

Comment BowFlex gagne et dépense de l'argent. Sur la base des derniers bénéfices déclarés, sur une base LTM.

Historique des gains et des recettes

OTCPK:BFXX.Q Recettes, dépenses et bénéfices (USD Millions )
DateRecettesLes revenusDépenses G+ADépenses de R&D
31 Mar 24206-907117
31 Dec 23226-737617
30 Sep 23257-497918
30 Jun 23274-528420
31 Mar 23287-1079422
31 Dec 22338-10510423
30 Sep 22387-10712524
30 Jun 22460-9613824
31 Mar 22590-2214523
31 Dec 216762715220
30 Sep 217186913518
30 Jun 2173510813017
31 Mar 216658911916
31 Dec 205536111516
30 Sep 204673511415
30 Jun 20374-811014
31 Mar 20319-8211514
31 Dec 19309-9212514
30 Sep 19320-9413815
30 Jun 19350-8114116
31 Mar 19366-214217
31 Dec 183971514417
30 Sep 184092214217
30 Jun 184062613916
31 Mar 184082814216
31 Dec 174062814315
30 Sep 174043114215
30 Jun 173973114514
31 Mar 173983214614
31 Dec 164063514414
30 Sep 163893313913
30 Jun 163792913912
31 Mar 163602813211
31 Dec 153362712310
30 Sep 15322271189
30 Jun 15310261138
31 Mar 15299251108
31 Dec 14274201037
30 Sep 1425718967
30 Jun 1424417927
31 Mar 1423148896
31 Dec 1321948856
30 Sep 1320747835

Des revenus de qualité: BFXX.Q n'est actuellement pas rentable.

Augmentation de la marge bénéficiaire: BFXX.Q n'est actuellement pas rentable.

Analyse des flux de trésorerie disponibles par rapport aux bénéfices

Analyse de la croissance passée des bénéfices

Tendance des revenus: BFXX.Q n'est pas rentable et les pertes ont augmenté au cours des 5 dernières années à un rythme de 16.2% par an.

Accélération de la croissance: Impossible de comparer la croissance des bénéfices de BFXX.Q au cours de l'année écoulée à sa moyenne sur 5 ans car elle n'est actuellement pas rentable

Bénéfices par rapport au secteur d'activité: BFXX.Q n'est pas rentable, ce qui rend difficile la comparaison de sa croissance des bénéfices de l'année écoulée avec celle du secteur Leisure ( -10.1% ).

Rendement des fonds propres

ROE élevé: Le passif BFXX.Q dépasse son actif, il est donc difficile de calculer son rendement des capitaux propres.

Rendement des actifs

Rendement des capitaux employés

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Analyse de l'entreprise et données financières

DonnéesDernière mise à jour (heure UTC)
Analyse de l'entreprise2024/08/19 08:52
Cours de l'action en fin de journée2024/08/19 00:00
Les revenus2024/03/31
Revenus annuels2024/03/31

Sources de données

Les données utilisées dans notre analyse de l'entreprise proviennent de S&P Global Market Intelligence LLC. Les données suivantes sont utilisées dans notre modèle d'analyse pour générer ce rapport. Les données sont normalisées, ce qui peut entraîner un délai avant que la source ne soit disponible.

PaquetDonnéesCadre temporelExemple de source américaine *
Finances de l'entreprise10 ans
  • Compte de résultat
  • Tableau des flux de trésorerie
  • Bilan
Estimations consensuelles des analystes+3 ans
  • Prévisions financières
  • Objectifs de prix des analystes
Prix du marché30 ans
  • Cours des actions
  • Dividendes, scissions et actions
Propriété10 ans
  • Actionnaires principaux
  • Délits d'initiés
Gestion10 ans
  • L'équipe dirigeante
  • Conseil d'administration
Principaux développements10 ans
  • Annonces de l'entreprise

* Exemple pour les titres américains ; pour les titres non américains, des formulaires réglementaires et des sources équivalentes sont utilisés.

Sauf indication contraire, toutes les données financières sont basées sur une période annuelle mais mises à jour trimestriellement. C'est ce qu'on appelle les données des douze derniers mois (TTM) ou des douze derniers mois (LTM). En savoir plus.

Modèle d'analyse et flocon de neige

Les détails du modèle d’analyse utilisé pour générer ce rapport sont disponibles sur notre page Github; nous proposons également des guides expliquant comment utiliser nos rapports et des tutoriels sur Youtube.

Découvrez l'équipe de classe mondiale qui a conçu et construit le modèle d'analyse Simply Wall St.

Indicateurs de l'industrie et du secteur

Nos indicateurs de secteur et de section sont calculés toutes les 6 heures par Simply Wall St. Les détails de notre processus sont disponibles sur Github.

Sources des analystes

BowFlex Inc. est couverte par 11 analystes. 0 de ces analystes ont soumis les estimations de revenus ou de bénéfices utilisées comme données d'entrée dans notre rapport. Les soumissions des analystes sont mises à jour tout au long de la journée.

AnalysteInstitution
Rommel DionisioAegis Capital Corporation
Eric WoldB. Riley Securities, Inc.
Steven DyerCraig-Hallum Capital Group LLC