AnimalDoctorKwon

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Animal doctor. Mispricing Investor

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A176750·about 21 hours agoDuChemBio absorbs Radio DNS Labs as Novartis injects 140B KRW into Korean RLT. With 100%+ OCF/EBITDA, the 6-mo lag is a de-risked steal.

After I posted the analysis on Duchem on the 23rd, Duchem hit the daily upper limit on the KOSDAQ market on the 24th. (South Korea’s KOSDAQ caps daily gains at 30%.)

NOTV.Q·5 months agoWhy March 6 and March 31 Matter

Why Did the Creditors Not Kill Inotiv? For months, one of the most widely discussed risks surrounding Inotiv (NASDAQ: NOTV) was the March credit covenant test. Many investors believed that this date could become a decisive moment for the company’s survival. The narrative was simple: if Inotiv failed the covenant test, lenders could potentially force a default, accelerate the debt, or push the company into a distressed restructuring. However, the situation has evolved. In February 2026, Inotiv disclosed the Eighth Amendment to its Credit Agreement with its lenders. Under this amendment, certain financial covenant requirements were waived or adjusted, effectively removing the immediate pressure of a near-term covenant breach. This change alters the narrative in an important way. Credit covenants are among the most powerful control mechanisms lenders possess. When a borrower violates those covenants, creditors typically gain the right to demand immediate repayment, renegotiate the terms under distress, or enforce collateral. In many distressed situations, companies do not collapse because their businesses suddenly disappear — they collapse because covenants trigger a technical default. Yet in the case of Inotiv, the lenders did not choose that path. Instead, they agreed to modify the credit agreement again. This is not the first time. The company has previously entered multiple amendments with its lenders, suggesting that the creditors have repeatedly chosen cooperation over liquidation. This raises a much more interesting question: Why did the creditors not pull the trigger?

ACAD·5 months agoACAD: Trofinetide EU Setback And Execution Risks Will Likely Restrain Upside

In summary, while the updated valuation attempts to incorporate new assumptions and risk factors, several elements of the modeling framework appear internally inconsistent or insufficiently explained. A clearer alignment between profitability assumptions, valuation multiples, and growth expectations—combined with a deeper examination of commercial adoption dynamics—may provide a more coherent basis for assessing ACADIA’s intrinsic value. These observations are offered with respect for the work that went into the original analysis and with the intention of contributing to a more balanced and rigorous discussion of ACADIA’s long-term outlook.

ACAD·5 months agoACAD: Trofinetide EU Setback And Execution Risks Will Likely Restrain Upside

Third, the discussion of the EMA CHMP negative opinion on trofinetide may overstate its long-term valuation impact. Regulatory setbacks are certainly relevant, but ACADIA’s current commercial performance is primarily driven by the U.S. market through Nuplazid and Daybue. While the European opportunity could represent incremental upside, it is not the core driver of present revenue. Moreover, regulatory reconsideration processes at the EMA are not uncommon, particularly in rare disease therapeutics where additional data interpretation or post-marketing commitments can influence outcomes over time. Fourth, the analysis places considerable emphasis on pipeline uncertainty, including programs such as ACP-204 and other early-stage assets. While pipeline risk should always be acknowledged, ACADIA is no longer a purely development-stage biotechnology company. It is a commercial-stage company with two marketed therapies already generating meaningful revenue. In such situations, valuation is typically more sensitive to commercial execution factors—such as patient identification, physician adoption, and payer coverage—than to early-stage pipeline uncertainty alone. Finally, one factor that appears underexplored is the real-world adoption trajectory of Daybue for Rett syndrome. As the first FDA-approved therapy targeting the underlying biology of Rett syndrome, Daybue operates in a rare disease market where treatment penetration and diagnostic expansion can meaningfully influence long-term revenue potential. Even modest changes in patient identification rates or treatment penetration could materially affect revenue outcomes, suggesting that commercial adoption dynamics may warrant more detailed analysis than currently presented.

ACAD·5 months agoACAD: Trofinetide EU Setback And Execution Risks Will Likely Restrain Upside

I appreciate the effort that went into the recent analysis of ACADIA Pharmaceuticals and the attempt to incorporate updated assumptions regarding growth, margins, and valuation multiples. However, after reviewing the arguments and modeling adjustments in detail, I find it difficult to fully agree with several aspects of the conclusion. I would like to offer a respectful counter-perspective on a few areas where the reasoning appears internally inconsistent or incomplete. First, there appears to be a tension within the valuation framework itself. The analysis lowers the long-term net profit margin assumption significantly—from 15.7% to 8.09%—which implies a materially weaker profitability outlook. In most valuation frameworks, such a deterioration in structural profitability would normally justify a lower valuation multiple. However, the model simultaneously increases the forward P/E multiple from 20.37x to 38.89x. Conceptually, these two adjustments move in opposite directions: a structurally weaker margin profile would typically compress the multiple investors are willing to pay, not expand it. Without a clear explanation for why the market would reward declining profitability with a materially higher earnings multiple, this combination of assumptions is difficult to reconcile. Second, the report slightly raises the long-term revenue growth assumption—from 8.92% to 8.97%—yet still arrives at a lower fair value estimate. In most discounted cash flow frameworks, an increase in expected growth should exert upward pressure on valuation unless it is offset by a materially higher discount rate or a substantial reduction in long-term profitability. In this case, however, the discount rate change—from 7.07% to 7.09%—is extremely small and would not meaningfully alter valuation outputs in most financial models. As a result, the rationale for the downward revision in fair value is not entirely clear from the adjustments presented.