| Snowflake Score | |
|---|---|
| Valuation | 4/6 |
| Future Growth | 1/6 |
| Past Performance | 2/6 |
| Financial Health | 2/6 |
| Dividends | 5/6 |
NWL Stock Overview
Newell Brands Inc. designs, manufactures, sources, and distributes consumer and commercial products worldwide.
Newell Brands Inc. Competitors
Price History & Performance
| Historical stock prices | |
|---|---|
| Current Share Price | US$21.42 |
| 52 Week High | US$26.45 |
| 52 Week Low | US$17.40 |
| Beta | 0.75 |
| 1 Month Change | 12.74% |
| 3 Month Change | 3.63% |
| 1 Year Change | -14.66% |
| 3 Year Change | 33.04% |
| 5 Year Change | -56.07% |
| Change since IPO | 78.50% |
Recent News & Updates
Stanley Black & Decker And Newell Brands: Same Fate In Store?
NWL and SWK share a number of similarities: both have made bold acquisitions, have recurring restructuring costs, have received adverse opinions from their auditors, and exhibit below-average profitability. In this article, I will discuss these similarities but also highlight important differences, which investors should keep in mind. For example, goodwill impairments were central to NWL's agenda, whereas SWK's management has proven to be more prudent capital allocators. Going forward, however, impairment charges do not seem an unreasonable expectation. I will also show how Newell's business improved after the company was shaken up by activists - an event I think is very unlikely to happen at Stanley Black & Decker. At first glance, Stanley Black & Decker (SWK) and Newell Brands (NWL) are not necessarily comparable companies. SWK, which I have already reported on, primarily develops, manufactures and distributes hand and power tools for consumers and professionals, as well as industrial fasteners. Its well-known brands include Stanley, Black+Decker, DeWalt, Craftsman, Facom and Proto. NWL is mainly involved in writing, baby, outdoor and leisure, and home appliances businesses. It owns well-known brands such as Rubbermaid, Coleman, Marmot, Nuk, Waterman, Parker, Dymo, Elmer’s, and Yankee Candle. I have been following the company since 2018 and have written several articles during that time. What the two companies have in common is that they have a history of seemingly one-off charges due to acquisition-related restructuring efforts, but NWL in particular has performed miserably since its bold acquisition of Jarden Corporation in late 2015 (Figure 1). Since 2016 - and including dividends - SWK and NWL have posted annualized returns of -1% and -11%, respectively, according to FAST Graphs, while the S&P 500 has gained nearly 13% over the same period on an annualized basis. Since the acquisition of Black & Decker in 2009/10, SWK has posted an annualized return of 7.3%, still trailing the S&P 500 by nearly five percentage points. However, SWK has been performing miserably since mid-2021 and especially since early 2022, when the company had to restate its earnings (see my detailed discussion on this topic) and lowered its forecasts in April and July. Therefore, it could rightly be asked whether SWK is destined to suffer the fate of Newell Brands: Billions of dollars in impairment charges, declining profitability, weak cash flow conversion, a management team that over-promises and under-delivers - and ultimately, weak shareholder returns. Figure 1: Relative share price performance of SWK and NWL since 2009 (own work, based on each company’s weekly closing stock price, normalized to the January 01 2009 share price) Restructuring Charges – When A One-Time Event Becomes A Permanent Condition I have analyzed the financial statements of NWL and SWK since 2010, thereby taking into account SWK's merger with Black & Decker and NWL's acquisition of Jarden in 2015. In absolute terms, SWK reported significantly higher restructuring-related expenses since 2010 (Figure 2). It seems worth noting that SWK sometimes refers to this item as "restructuring costs and asset impairments", although the company has not recorded any material impairment-related costs since at least 2010 (as discussed later). Figure 2: SWK’s and NWL’s historical restructuring costs (own work, based on each company’s 2010 to 2021 10-Ks) To better appreciate the magnitude of the costs shown in Figure 2, I relate them to post-merger and 2021 sales. Since 2016, NWL recorded $338 million in restructuring costs, representing 2.5% and 3.2% of 2016 and 2021 sales, respectively. SWK recorded $1.2 billion, or 14.8% and 8.0% of 2010 and 2021 revenue, respectively. 14.8% is a very high figure, but it takes into account a much longer period - Black & Decker was acquired in 2009/10. Over the same period, NWL recorded restructuring costs of $762 million, or 13.5% and 7.2% of 2010 and 2021 revenue, respectively. Of course, these costs should be considered by investors assessing the actual earnings power of each business. Given that Newell Brands has been undergoing a restructuring process since 2018 (see my related articles from late 2018, early 2019 and late 2019), it seems reasonable to consider only most recent restructuring charges and expect a completion of the restructuring process in the near future. In my latest article, I discussed signs that point to a conclusion of the process. SWK is still in the midst of a multi-year process of transitioning its portfolio to a tool-centric business, highlighted by restructuring-related charges of $72 million in the first half of 2022, an increase of $60 million year-over-year. The company recently announced the sale of its Oil & Gas, Security, and Access Technologies businesses. Based on an analysis of SWK's remaining portfolio, it therefore seems reasonable to assume that the process will be completed soon. However, as the company has laid-out a cost reduction plan (slide 7 f., Q2 2022 earnings presentation), investors should expect further restructuring-related charges. Involvement of Activist Investors And Improving Fundamentals In early 2018, a battle over board seats at Newell Brands emerged. Activist investor Starboard teamed up with Jarden chairman Martin Franklin in an attempt to oust Newell's CEO and the entire board. A few months later, however, activist investor Carl Icahn, with Starboard's support, succeeded in appointing three new independent directors to the NWL board, averting a proxy battle. Newell's then-CEO Michael Polk (who had overseen the Jarden transaction) was shown the door, and Brett Icahn (Carl's son) was nominated to Newell's board. The company sold a large part of its portfolio. Revenue declined 41% year-over-year in 2018, from $14.7 billion to $8.6 billion, and proceeds were used for share repurchases and debt reduction. Newell's operating margin has improved 2% since 2019, and its cash conversion cycle is also on a solid path (Figure 3). In this context, SWK's recently increased cash conversion cycle should not be overstated due to the recent increase in inventories (see my detailed analysis). Figure 3: SWK’s and NWL’s historical cash conversion cycle (own work, based on each company’s 2010 to 2021 10-Ks) Recently, there has been speculation that an activist could also become involved in SWK. The company definitely has its issues at the moment, such as ongoing supply chain bottlenecks (leading to a steep rise in inventories and consequently abysmal free cash flow) and weakening demand due to the economic slowdown and likely declining brand loyalty, but it is still in good shape overall. Debt levels are substantial, but nowhere near as high as they were at Newell in 2017, when the company's debt level was a staggering 20 times 2015-2017 average free cash flow. SWK's free cash flow has been quite volatile recently, but on average it would take SWK only about six years to pay off all of its debt if it suspended its dividend and buybacks. This estimate does not take into account the proceeds from recent asset sales, which will significantly reduce leverage. Moreover, SWK is still an investment-grade company, as evidenced by its "A"-rated long-term (Standard & Poor's). In contrast, Newell lost its investment-grade rating in the midst of its turnaround (late 2019) when the company announced it would retain certain businesses it had previously planned to sell. Nevertheless, the company recently regained its former "BBB-" rating. All in all, I think an activist's stake in SWK is pretty unlikely, even if there is plenty of room for improvement, as underlined, for example, by the measly returns on invested capital. The company has recently unveiled a cost reduction plan and is in the process of transforming its portfolio into a tool-centric one. However, I would not be surprised if one or another hedge fund or similar investor reports a passive holding to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), given SWK's current low valuation. The restructuring at Newell Brands is bearing fruit and the company is on a good path - the valuation does not fully reflect this, largely due to the weak macroeconomic environment and the fact that management is still largely relying on highly normalized figures. Lack in Effective Internal Control Systems The auditors of both Newell Brands and Stanley Black & Decker stated in their reports that the respective company did not maintain effective internal controls over financial reporting. In January 2022, SWK announced that it had received an opinion from the SEC regarding its accounting for equity investments. The company determined that errors were made in its original accounting conclusions due to material weaknesses in its internal control over financial reporting for such instruments. Accordingly, the issue was highlighted in the 2021 10-K by SWK's auditor, Ernst & Young (p. 64 et seq., 2021 10-K), and the company was required to restate its latest results. As I have outlined, I do not consider the misrepresentation (intentional or unintentional) to be of particular concern, although it is to be expected that investor sentiment will remain subdued for the foreseeable future. Moreover, management statements and corporate reports will likely continue to be subject to heightened scrutiny for the foreseeable future. Based on the 2018 financial statements, Newell Brands' auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers ((PWC)), concluded that the company did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting because the company had not designed and maintained effective controls over accounting for the effects of divestitures (p. 40 et seq., 2018 10-K). In fiscal 2019 and 2020, the company apparently still did not have effective internal controls over financial reporting, and the 2021 10-K is the first annual report in which the auditor has issued an unqualified opinion on Newell's financial statements and related financial reporting. Of course, the problem highlighted by PWC reflects poorly on Newell's management at the time, and the auditor's comments do not seem overly surprising given the many moving levers in the early stages of the restructuring. However, given the signs that the turnaround is taking hold, the fact that several years have passed since the auditor noted the lack of effective internal controls, and since Michael Polk et al. are a thing of the past, I would not overstate the issue at this time. Also, it seems worth noting that Newell Brands was not required to restate its earnings. In summary, the problem pointed out by Newell's auditor is a thing of the past, and I would not decide against investing in the company solely because of that problem. The problem at SWK seems a bit more serious, primarily because it has resulted in inflated earnings per share ($7.77 vs. $7.46 in 2020, $6.35 vs. $6.11 in 2019). Critical investors could potentially suspect intentional misconduct here, but I give management the benefit of the doubt given the magnitude of the misstatement and the fact that the problem relates to the accounting of equity units. In addition, the financial statements of SWK and NWL present a true and fair view of the financial position of each company in all material respects - the problems related only to internal control mechanisms. Therefore, I do not consider these problems as a criterion for excluding potential investments, but I am aware that they can (and probably will) have a lasting negative impact on investor sentiment. Transaction Valuations As a result of the rather bold acquisitions, goodwill and other intangible assets of both companies increased significantly, however, Newell's merger with Jarden Corporation was much larger, as shown in Figure 4. It therefore seems somewhat surprising that NWL's and SWK's revenues increased by almost identical amounts due to the consolidation of the respective acquired entity, i.e., by about 125% compared to the previous year. Figure 4: Statistics related to NWL’s and SWK’s goodwill and other intangible assets (own work, based on SWK’s and NWL’s 2009/2010 and 2015/2016 10-Ks, respectively)
Newell Brands' (NASDAQ:NWL) Dividend Will Be $0.23
Newell Brands Inc.'s ( NASDAQ:NWL ) investors are due to receive a payment of $0.23 per share on 15th of September. The...
Shareholder Returns
| NWL | US Consumer Durables | US Market | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7D | 7.7% | 5.6% | 4.5% |
| 1Y | -14.7% | -24.4% | -8.9% |
Return vs Industry: NWL exceeded the US Consumer Durables industry which returned -27.2% over the past year.
Return vs Market: NWL underperformed the US Market which returned -9.6% over the past year.
Price Volatility
| NWL volatility | |
|---|---|
| NWL Average Weekly Movement | 6.2% |
| Consumer Durables Industry Average Movement | 7.8% |
| Market Average Movement | 7.6% |
| 10% most volatile stocks in US Market | 16.8% |
| 10% least volatile stocks in US Market | 3.1% |
Stable Share Price: NWL is not significantly more volatile than the rest of US stocks over the past 3 months, typically moving +/- 6% a week.
Volatility Over Time: NWL's weekly volatility (6%) has been stable over the past year.
About the Company
| Founded | Employees | CEO | Website |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1903 | 32,000 | Ravi Saligram | https://www.newellbrands.com |
Newell Brands Inc. designs, manufactures, sources, and distributes consumer and commercial products worldwide. It operates in five segments: Commercial Solutions, Home Appliances, Home Solutions, Learning and Development, and Outdoor and Recreation. The Commercial Solutions segment provides commercial cleaning and maintenance solutions; closet and garage organization products; hygiene systems and material handling solutions; and home and security, and smoke and carbon monoxide alarms products under the BRK, First Alert, Mapa, Quickie, Rubbermaid, Rubbermaid Commercial Products, and Spontex brands.
Newell Brands Inc. Fundamentals Summary
| NWL fundamental statistics | |
|---|---|
| Market Cap | US$8.86b |
| Earnings (TTM) | US$724.00m |
| Revenue (TTM) | US$10.51b |
12.2x
P/E Ratio0.8x
P/S RatioIs NWL overvalued?
See Fair Value and valuation analysisEarnings & Revenue
| NWL income statement (TTM) | |
|---|---|
| Revenue | US$10.51b |
| Cost of Revenue | US$7.24b |
| Gross Profit | US$3.27b |
| Other Expenses | US$2.55b |
| Earnings | US$724.00m |
Last Reported Earnings
Jun 30, 2022
Next Earnings Date
n/a
| Earnings per share (EPS) | 1.75 |
| Gross Margin | 31.11% |
| Net Profit Margin | 6.89% |
| Debt/Equity Ratio | 133.2% |
How did NWL perform over the long term?
See historical performance and comparisonDividends
4.3%
Current Dividend Yield54%
Payout RatioDoes NWL pay a reliable dividends?
See NWL dividend history and benchmarks| Newell Brands dividend dates | |
|---|---|
| Ex Dividend Date | Aug 30 2022 |
| Dividend Pay Date | Sep 15 2022 |
| Days until Ex dividend | 12 days |
| Days until Dividend pay date | 28 days |
Does NWL pay a reliable dividends?
See NWL dividend history and benchmarks