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PlaySide Studios: Market Is Sleeping on a Potential 10M+ Unit Breakout Year, FY26 Could Be the Rerate of the Decade

Published
06 Feb 26
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HegelBayeBagel's Fair Value
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1Y
22.5%
7D
-16.9%

Author's Valuation

AU$0.8470.8% undervalued intrinsic discount

HegelBayeBagel's Fair Value

PlaySide Studios (ASX: PLY) is still being priced like a sleepy, low-growth work-for-hire studio, despite now sitting on the largest and most statistically credible IP slate in its history, backed by hard wishlist data and a materially leaner cost base.

After reviewing the updated Steam wishlist data, indie comps, sell-through ratios, past margins and the latest company guidance, my view is:

If the upcoming slate lands even “normally well”, FY26 earnings power justifies a move from ~0.265 today into the 0.70–1.00 range over the next 12–18 months, with upside beyond that if one title genuinely breaks out.

1. Mouse: P.I. for Hire is now in the absolute top tier of Steam titles

Mouse: P.I. for Hire has now passed 1.2 million Steam wishlists and is currently ranked as the ~17th most wishlisted game globally on Steam — before the main marketing push even begins.

Context matters here:

  • Only ~6% of games ever reach 100k wishlists
  • Only ~20–25 titles in a given year reach 1m+
  • Mouse now sits in roughly the top 0.3–0.4% of all Steam titles by wishlist count

Based on a dataset of ~5,700 games released since mid-2024:

  • Correlation between wishlists at launch and first-month unit sales ≈ 70%
  • Wishlist count explains ~49% of variance in first-month sales
  • Once a title clears 1m wishlists, the sales distribution shifts materially upward, with long-tail outcomes skewing toward multi-million unit sellers

Importantly, higher-priced games (USD 30+) with strong wishlists show better wishlist-to-sale conversion than the overall median (~0.28). Mouse sits squarely in that cohort.

Using conservative assumptions:

  • Price: USD 40 (~AUD 60)
  • Launch wishlists: 1.2m
  • First-month conversion: 0.28

That implies roughly 330k units in month one, or ~20–22m AUD of launch-period revenue across platforms.

The same statistical work shows that for well-reviewed titles starting at this wishlist level, 8–12m lifetime units is entirely plausible. At standard PC/console economics, that equates to ~120–200m AUD of lifetime gross revenue.

Even assuming PlaySide retains only 40–50% net economics as developer/publisher, that is still very large relative to a market cap around ~110–120m AUD at 0.265.

And this ignores a key point: Wishlist counts typically rise another ~25–35% in the final 4–5 months pre-launch. If Mouse pushes toward 1.5–2.0m wishlists, the probability of a genuine hit increases again.

2. Game of Thrones: War for Westeros is the second major shot the market is underpricing

The market is almost entirely focused on Mouse, but FY26 is really about Mouse + a Game of Thrones RTS.

Key points on the GoT title:

  • Already sits in upper wishlist percentiles despite limited marketing
  • Launches into a renewed Game of Thrones content cycle (House of the Dragon, Dunk & Egg)
  • Strategy is one of the strongest monetising PC genres
  • Developed and published by PlaySide, meaning materially better economics than work-for-hire
  • PlaySide has already proven RTS execution with Age of Darkness, which reviewed strongly

History around other major IPs (Fallout, Dune, Cyberpunk) shows how TV releases can lift related games. There’s no reason GoT should be different.

If the GoT RTS is simply “good”, ~10–20m AUD of FY26 revenue is very plausible. If it lands toward the higher end of expectations, 40–60m AUD is not unreasonable given brand strength, genre and wishlist positioning.

None of that is reflected in a 0.265 share price.

3. Dumb Ways to Die is a low-cost upside option

Dumb Ways to Die won’t move the needle like Mouse or GoT on its own, but it matters:

  • Fully owned IP
  • Huge historical mobile audience
  • Party-game format with strong streaming and couch-co-op dynamics

Even a modest success adds high-margin IP revenue, keeps the brand alive and supports merchandising and spin-offs. In portfolio terms, it’s a cheap call option.

4. Work-for-hire provides a real floor

Historically, 50–70% of PlaySide revenue has come from work-for-hire:

  • Long-term clients include Meta, Netflix Games, Activision and Take-Two
  • Only one project cancelled in five years
  • Most contracts renew or expand

FY25 looked weak because work-for-hire growth stalled, but the client list and renewal history remain intact. Industry trends toward outsourcing mid-market development also support this segment.

This is why PlaySide is not a binary indie lottery ticket. Services revenue pays the bills and buys time for IP to scale.

5. Cost base and margins are now set up very differently

Management has already acted:

  • ~$6m AUD of annualised operating costs removed (tracking ahead of guidance)
  • Marketing for Mouse and the slate funded up-front
  • No need for another capital raise to reach launch
  • Targeting EBITDA-positive 1H FY26, with full-year EBITDA of $8–10m

Historically:

  • FY22 net margin ≈ 16.5%
  • FY24 net margin ≈ 17.5%, EBITDA margin ≈ 27% on ~$65m revenue
  • FY23 and FY25 were investment years with compressed margins

FY25’s loss was largely discretionary (restructure + marketing), not structural.

A conservative FY26 scenario:

  • Work-for-hire: ~32m AUD
  • New IP + back catalogue: ~38m AUD
  • Group revenue: ~70m AUD
  • Net margin: ~15%

That implies ~10–11m AUD NPAT.

At a 20× earnings multiple, equity value ≈ 210–220m AUD, or roughly ~0.50 per share. Historically, the stock has traded on 25–40× when the slate is working.

Each additional $10m of revenue at mid-teens margins adds roughly $1.5–2m NPAT, equivalent to ~20–25m AUD of market cap, or ~4–5c per share at a 20× multiple.

6. Analyst targets already sit well above the current price

Recent published targets:

  • J.P. Morgan: 0.65
  • Canaccord Genuity: 0.60
  • Shaw and Partners: 0.43

The average is ~0.52, which is ~95% upside from 0.265.

Most of these were set before Mouse pushed through 1.2m wishlists and before updated data on 1m+ titles and long-tail outcomes became clearer.

7. Risk / reward still looks asymmetric

Downside risks are real:

  • Mouse could review poorly
  • GoT could slip or underperform
  • A major work-for-hire client could cut budgets
  • Micro-cap liquidity cuts both ways

In a full disappointment scenario, the stock could drift back toward ~0.15–0.18.

But the upside distribution is meaningfully larger:

  • Mouse is already elite-tier by wishlist data
  • GoT sits in a top-monetising genre with a massive brand
  • Dumb Ways adds optionality
  • Work-for-hire provides a revenue floor
  • The cost base is leaner than in FY24

If FY26 merely resembles FY24 on a slightly larger scale, 0.40–0.50 looks reasonable. If one of Mouse or GoT lands near what the wishlist curves imply, 0.70–1.00 becomes realistic. In a genuine breakout, 1.20+ is not crazy given prior sentiment cycles.

Bottom line

At ~0.265, the market is still mostly paying for the services floor and heavily discounting the IP upside, despite Mouse and Game of Thrones now showing hard, elite-tier demand signals.

This is not a story stock anymore there is real data behind it. To me, it remains a classic asymmetric setup: limited downside if things disappoint, and multi-bag potential if even one title lands close to what current evidence suggests.

Not financial advice.

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Disclaimer

The user HegelBayeBagel holds no position in ASX:PLY. Simply Wall St has no position in any of the companies mentioned. Simply Wall St may provide the securities issuer or related entities with website advertising services for a fee, on an arm's length basis. These relationships have no impact on the way we conduct our business, the content we host, or how our content is served to users. The author of this narrative is not affiliated with, nor authorised by Simply Wall St as a sub-authorised representative. This narrative is general in nature and explores scenarios and estimates created by the author. The narrative does not reflect the opinions of Simply Wall St, and the views expressed are the opinion of the author alone, acting on their own behalf. These scenarios are not indicative of the company's future performance and are exploratory in the ideas they cover. The fair value estimates are estimations only, and does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any stock, and they do not take account of your objectives, or your financial situation. Note that the author's analysis may not factor in the latest price-sensitive company announcements or qualitative material.

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